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Abstract
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete infor-
mation and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting
point is players’ preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially mappings from
states of the world to distributions of payoffs to be received by players. There are two
ways in which equilibria for this preference game can be defined. When the preferences
possess ever more features, we can gradually add ever more structures to the game.
These include real-valued utility-like functions over payoff-distribution vectors, sets of
probabilistic priors over states of the world, and eventually the traditional expected-
utility framework involving one single prior. We establish equilibrium existence results,
show the upper hemi-continuity of equilibrium sets over changing ambiguity attitudes,
and uncover relations between the two versions of equilibria. Some attention is paid
to the enterprising game, in which players exhibit ambiguity seeking attitudes while
betting optimistically on the favorable resolution of ambiguities. The two solution con-
cepts are unified at this game’s pure equilibria, whose existence is guaranteed when
strategic complementarities are present. The current framework can be applied to
settings like auctions involving ambiguity on competitors’ assessments of item worths.
Key words: Incomplete Information; Preference Relation; Ambiguity; Strategic Com-
plementarities; Auction
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the traditional expected-utility approach to games involving incomplete information, such
as Harsanyi’s [24], players’ types are used to model private messages they receive about the
uncertain external environments. After observing his own type tn, it is customary that player
n will form a probabilistic understanding pn,tn ≡ (pn,tn|t−n)t−n∈T−n about other players’ types
t−n ∈ T−n. Presented with others’ strategies, he will strive to maximize his own expected
utility, where expectation is taken with the aforementioned assessment pn,tn. To precisely
describe the actual uncertainty, however, it often takes more than even the entire collection
t ≡ (tn)n∈N of all players’ types. This is where states of the world ω will come into play.
A more detailed model might allow player n, after observing his own type tn, to predict
that the actual ω will come from some subset Ωn,tn of states of the world. Of course, it would
be necessary that Ωn,tn and Ωn,t′n be non-overlapping when tn 6= t
′
n, and that
⋃
tn∈Tn
Ωn,tn
for every player n be some common space Ω. Indeed, such is essentially the information
structure introduced by Aumann [4]. However, there seems to be no urgency in exploiting
the “ω-level” detail in the traditional approach, due to the “integration” of its effects.
Such is not necessarily the case when players’ ambiguities have to be taken into account.
Suppose all players adopt potentially random actions based on their types. When the actual
ω ∈ Ω is eventually revealed, all players’ types will be known: there is a unique t ≡ (tn)n∈N
such that ω ∈ Ωt ≡
⋂
n∈N Ωn,tn . Then, every player will know the probabilistic distribution
over his payoffs that he is supposed to experience. Of course, post decision, he will eventually
experience just one single payoff. Now during the play, right after receiving his own type tn
but before knowing anything about others’ types t−n let alone the true ω, player n should
anticipate one payoff distribution say π(ω) per ω ∈ Ωn,tn ≡
⋃
t−n∈T−n
Ωtn,t−n . He will certainly
want to make the vector π ≡ (π(ω)|ω ∈ Ωn,tn) as likable to himself as possible. Each payoff-
distribution vector π is essentially an act first proposed by Anscombe and Aumann [3].
A natural apparatus to express the “(n, tn)”-player’s taste is a strict preference relation-
ship ≻n,tn on all payoff-distribution vectors. With it, one can understand π ≻n,tn π
′ as
the player-type pair liking π better than π′ but not the other way around. The traditional
expected-utility approach basically uses what we shall call a real-valued satisfaction function
sn,tn on payoff-distribution vectors π to facilitate each (n, tn)-player’s preference relation:
π ≻n,tn π
′ if and only if sn,tn(π) > sn,tn(π
′); (1)
moreover, sn,tn is specially built from one single probabilistic prior ρn,tn on the state space
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Ωn,tn and a utility function un,tn on payoffs, in the fashion of
sn,tn(π) = s
0
n,tn(π, ρn,tn) =
∫
Ωn,tn
[∫
un,tn · d[π(ω)]
]
· ρn,tn(dω). (2)
This, at least in formality, amounts to sn,tn(π) =
∫
un,tn · d[
∫
Ωn,tn
π(ω) · ρn,tn(dω)] as well.
So it is as though the various π(ω)-components are first averaged over using weights
provided by the ρn,tn-distribution; then the integrated payoff distribution or lottery is com-
bined with the utility function un,tn to generate the satisfaction level over the given payoff-
distribution vector π. The linear treatment of the lottery on payoffs through the utility
function un,tn can be legitimized by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s [41] axioms; the ap-
propriateness of using a single prior ρn,tn to assemble the lottery can be reasoned using
Savage’s [43] arguments. Both features have been used in the traditional modeling of not
only incomplete-information but also normal-form games; see, e.g., Harsanyi [24] and Nash
[39][40]. Of course, there is no need to single out the latter because they can be treated as
special incomplete-information games in which every player has only one type.
Both linear treatments of payoff distributions and the latter’s formations out of payoff-
distribution vectors through the uses of single probabilistic priors have been criticized. First,
Allais [2] challenged the notion that people use linear functionals over payoff distributions
to reach decisions. Empirical studies in support of this contention can be found, e.g., in
Camerer and Ho [9] and Wu and Gonzalez [52].
Then, Ellsberg [17] argued that decision makers (DMs) often do not even know the
probabilities to be assigned to different states of the world. For instance, there are probably
not enough data to estimate the chance of a new financial crisis to occur within the next
two years; also, there has no precedent to be relied on to assess probabilities concerning
the climate change due to human actitivies. Hence, to many situations the single-prior
assumption on uncertain factors can be ill suited. Starting from Schmeidler [45], researchers
resorted to tools like Choquet integration and capacities, i.e., non-additive probabilities,
to help with single-agent decision making involving general ambiguity attitudes; see, e.g.,
Gilboa and Marinacci [21]. Under axioms associated with ambiguity aversion, Gilboa and
Schmeidler [22] legitimized the worst-prior form to be taken by a DM. In this form,
sn,tn(π) = inf
ρ∈Pn,tn
s0n,tn(π, ρ), (3)
where Pn,tn is a set of prior distributions on the space Ωn,tn and s
0
n,tn is defined in (2).
3
1.2 Main Contributions
In the current strategic setting involving incomplete information, failure to account for play-
ers’ diverse ambiguity attitudes could lead to weird predictions or dangerous prescriptions.
In auctions, especially those involving works of art, offshore oilfields, or electromagnetic
spectra, participants often do not know for sure the actual worths to themselves of the item
being auctioned; very likely, they are also uncertain about the distributions their competitors
assign to the item’s worths; in addition, some may fear losing the object more than they
regret about overpaying for it. How can a model capture these features then? The prevalent
auction theory takes the traditional approach to incomplete-information games; hence, it is
not able to model bidders’ unconventional ambiguity attitudes.
We make an attempt at overcoming the above shortcoming by defining a more general
preference game from the mere preference relations ≻n,tn , without imposing any structural
requirement. Incidentally, a certain set of requirements led Anscombe and Aumann [3] to the
simultaneous emergence of both the utility function un,tn and the probabilistic prior ρn,tn of
the traditional form (2). But without help from any such structure, behavioral equilibria can
already be defined. There is admittedly a growing game-theoretic literature on ambiguity
considerations. Against this backdrop, this work still makes substantial contributions.
First, we propose a game-theoretic framework starting from players’ preference relations
on payoff-distribution vectors. This enables the incorporation of players’ diverse ambiguity
attitudes on external factors. Our emphasis here is not the consideration of preferences
itself. In various strategic settings, this has been done by, e.g., Schmeidler [44], Mas-Colell
[33], Shafer and Sonnenschein [46], Khan and Sun [28], and Grant, Meneghel, and Tourky
[23]. It is preferences on payoff-distribution vectors that we want to stress. We believe such
preferences provide more flexibility than those on actions, action distributions, integrated
payoff distributions, or payoff vectors. This can probably be attested to by the inclusion of
various existing models in the current framework. On the flip side, while based on players’
anticipations of their own payoffs rather than other players’ strategies, our preferences are
more natural and parsimonious choices for model primitives.
Second, we give definitions to two prominent types of behavioral equilibria and estab-
lish their existence and continuity in various circumstances. Previously unknown relations
between the two equilibrium notions are uncovered as well. The first, action-based interpre-
tation leaves every player in control of his action whilst maintaining a long-term commitment
to his portion of a behavioral equilibrium. The second, distribution-based interpretation ties
every player’s action to the outcome of a random device in a fashion consistent to his por-
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tion of an equilibrium. It will soon be clear that an action-based equilibrium assigns weights
only to actions that leave no room for improvement by any other pure action; whereas, a
distribution-based equilibrium leaves no room for improvement by any other distribution of
actions. Since there are “more” action distributions than pure actions to compete against,
distribution-based equilibria are in general “harder to come by” than action-based ones.
Third, we step into the less traveled ambiguity-seeking territory and make interesting
findings. Since Ellsberg’s [17] pioneering work, most attention has been paid to ambiguity
aversion as an alternative attitude to ambiguity neutrality. However, experiments involving
human subjects showed that ambiguity seeking could be equally prevalent; see, e.g., Curley
and Yates [11] and Charness, Karni, and Levin [10]. We also believe that optimistic assess-
ments of uncertain gains is part of what drive people to participate in auctions, embark on
exploratory journeys, and start new firms. Thus, the case opposite to that assuming (3) is
equally if not more interesting. We call the corresponding game “enterprising” because each
sn,tn(π) = sup
ρ∈Pn,tn
s0n,tn(π, ρ), (4)
so that players make optimistic bets on favorable resolutions of their ambiguities.
The action-distribution distinction turns out to be irrelevant for the enterprising game’s
pure equilibria, given that they exist. When equipped with strategic complementarity fea-
tures, the game can be shown to possess not only pure equilibria, but also those with mono-
tone trends with respect to players’ types as well as external conditions. These results can be
considered as extensions of those achieved for the traditional counterpart as laid out in van
Zandt and Vives [54]. As normal-form games are incomplete-information games with single-
ton type spaces, the results also generalize those that appeared in traditional supermodular
games studied by Topkis [49], Milgrom and Roberts [35], and Vives [51].
Finally, our findings are applicable to settings like auctions involving ambiguity on bid-
ders’ assessments of item worths and competitive pricing involving uncertain demand curves.
1.3 Outline of Results
Under mild conditions, we show that action-based equilibria always exist. When the pref-
erences ≻n,tn connote ambiguity aversion, distribution-based ones will come into being as
well; see Theorem 1. Both sets of equilibria are upper hemi-continuous in players’ ambiguity
attitudes; see Theorem 2. When the preferences are representable by real-valued functions
sn,tn satisfying (1), our game is specialized to the so-called satisfaction kind. For this game,
action-based equilibria will exist in general and so will distribution-based equilibria when the
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sn,tn’s are quasi-concave. When there is a set Pn,tn of prior distributions on the state space
Ωn,tn , so that each sn,tn takes Gilboa and Schmeidler’s [22] form (3), we shall obtain the
so-called alarmists’ game. In it, players express aversions to ambiguities. Due to concavity
of the sn,tn ’s, the game has both action- and distribution-based equilibria.
For the preference game, rudimentary understandings on relations between the action-
and distribution-based equilibria can be formed. Our message will become considerably
sharper for the satisfaction game. For it, we can conclude that distribution-based equilibria
will be action-based ones when players are ambiguity-seeking and the two types will be
identical when players are ambiguity-neutral; see Theorem 3. Relatedly, as might have been
suspected, the distinction between the two versions of equilibria will cease to matter for
the traditional expected-utility game; see Theorem 4. Our derivation relies on concepts like
continuous kernels and their integrations, as well as intermediate results like Lemma 1 that
might be of value elsewhere. When we focus on pure equilibria, we again confirm the earlier
“comparative rarity” observation by showing that any pure distribution-based equilibrium
must also be a pure action-based one; see Theorem 5.
Our attention then shifts to the enterprising game in which players demonstrate ambiguity-
seeking traits. As a special satisfaction game with convex sn,tn functions, any distribution-
based equilibrium of this game is necessarily an action-based one. When confined to pure
strategies, we also have the equivalence between the two types of equilibria; see Theorem 6.
One technical result involved in its proof is Lemma 2. It is an extension of a well known
finite-dimensional property, stating that the maximum of a convex function over a convex
region in ℜd for some d = 1, 2, ... can always be achieved at extreme points.
Of special interest is the case where (i) each Ωt = {t} × Ω˜ for some common state space
Ω˜ and (ii) all ambiguities of an (n, tn)-player are on Ω˜ rather than other players’ types
t−n. This reflects the situation where players can form subjective probabilities pn,tn|t−n on
their opponents’ types much like in the traditional game, but with extra ambiguities on
other external factors. Borrowing ideas from works dealing with subjects like lattices and
submodularity, including Milgrom and Shannon [36], Zhou [55], Topkis [50], and Yang and Qi
[53], we can extend the traditional analysis of games possessing strategic complementarities
and obtain the existence of monotone pure equilibria as well as their monotone comparative
statics properties; see Theorems 7 and 8. An enabling technical result is Lemma 3 on the
preservation of increasing differences under maximization, much like a well known one about
the preservation of supermodularity under maximization.
In the following, we discuss existing game-theoretic literature with ambiguity considera-
tions in Section 2, and give a general formulation in Section 3. The existence and continuity
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of the two types of equilibria are derived in Section 4. We next delve into various special cases
in Section 5, and establish relationships between the two equilibrium concepts in Section 6.
The framework’s suitability to auctions is discussed in Section 7; finally, our conclusion is
reached in Section 8. A special enterprising game whose features lead to monotone pure
equilibria are detailed in Appendix C.
2 Literature Survey
Normal-form games incorporating general ambiguity attitudes have been studied. Dow and
Werlang [15] used convex capacities to model players’ beliefs about opponents’ behaviors
and arrived at equilibrium belief profiles. Eichberger and Kelsey [16] extended the study to
situations involving n ≥ 3 players and identified players’ confidence degrees for equilibrium
parametrization purposes. Marinacci [32], on the other hand, gave more flexible definitions
to players’ vaguenesses on their beliefs, which could then be used in comparative statics
studies. Klibanoff [27] and Lo [30] adopted Gilboa and Schmeidler’s [22] notion of ambiguity
aversion and used convex and closed sets of probabilistic priors on products of other players’
mixed strategies, reducible to those on their pure actions, as the basis on which players make
decisions. Epstein [18] let players be ambiguous about opponents’ pure strategies as well as
their ambiguity attitudes, and studied the iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
Players in the above games were allowed to have qualms about opponents’ behaviors.
We, like some studies of incomplete-information games involving general ambiguity atti-
tudes, focus on the complementary situation where players have vagueness about factors
external to all of them. We argue for merits of the ambiguity-on-external-factor rather
than ambiguity-on-opponent-behavior consideration as follows. First, as shown momentar-
ily, mixed strategies chosen by players are often enforceable. Second, uncertainties about the
state of the world can pose a much bigger problem than those about other players’ behaviors.
Think of a Stag Hunt game where each participant has only to choose between cooperate and
defect, and yet there are millions of combinations in numbers, sizes, and speeds of the stags
and hares on the hunting ground, as well as other factors like temperature and wind. Third,
no longer having to model players’ behaviors through non-probabilistic means, we can ap-
ply conventional tools built on countably additive probabilities to our analysis. Uncertainty
about opponents’ types will still indirectly lead to uncertainty about their preferences as well
as behaviors. Incidentally, Bade [6] introduced behavioral ambiguity by allowing players to
base their actions on uncontrollable factors that are not observable by opponents.
Regarding the verifiability of mixed strategies pronounced by players, there seem to be
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at least two plausible solutions. First, when the game merely reflects one encounter in
many repeated interactions, we propose that each player takes a frequentist approach to the
compliance of his proclaimed mixed strategy. Thus, he is at almost total control of his own
action in each play, but has to maintain agreed-upon frequencies to various actions in the
long run. Second, it is possible that every player is given a random number generator whose
output is private knowledge in-game but public knowledge post-game, and the player has to
act according to an agreed-upon mapping from the random device’s output to his action.
We call the first perspective action-based because players get to choose their actual actions
and the second distribution-based because players need to decide on distributions of actions
before they start to act. Equilibrium concepts in Dow and Werlang [15] and Marinacci
[32] are of the action-based variety; whereas, those in Klibanoff [27] and Lo [30] are of the
distribution-based variety. Also, Kajii and Ui [26] called the first kind “equilibria in beliefs”
and the second kind “mixed equilibria”.
Among works on incomplete-information games involving general ambiguity attitudes,
we note that Epstein and Wang [19] used preference relations over acts to express ambiguity
attitudes, and also allowed ambiguities over opponents’ preferences. This setup gave rise
to infinite sequences of preferences over preferences, much like Mertens and Zamir’s [34]
sequences of beliefs over beliefs. Under reasonable assumptions about allowable preferences,
authors justified the emergence of those largest necessary type spaces that contain players’
personal characteristics. Ahn [1] and Di Tillio [14] worked along a similar line, with the
former modeling ambiguities using sets of beliefs and the latter imposing less restrictions on
preferences but more on payoff and state spaces.
In our current study, exogenous factors ω within the state space Ω contain no information
on either opponents’ behaviors or their ambiguity attitudes. Each of player n’s types tn is a
private message he receives about the actual external factor. The (n, tn)-player is uncertain
which ω ∈ Ωn,tn has been realized. Consequently, he is uncertain about the actual opponent-
type profile t−n ∈ T−n because he does not know which Ωtn,t−n ⊆ Ωn,tn the ω is in. The various
preference relations ≻n,tn on “|Ωn,tn |-dimensional” payoff-distribution vectors reflect players’
ambiguity attitudes which might be under the sway of messages they receive. Like their
behaviors which as we have emphasized are observable and enforceable, players’ preferences
are assumed to be commonly known.
In real life, these entities might simply translate into a few choices on players’ personali-
ties. For instance, it is possible that one player be labeled “mildly conservative all the time”
while another “fairly reckless when knowing that the stake is high”. Just allowing ambigu-
ities on factors external to all players is applicable enough to a wide variety of practically
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relevant cases. Take, for example, an auction of the exploration right to an offshore oil field.
All bidders, being major petrochemical firms, probably know each other well through past
interactions. The major uncertainty then stems from the potential of the field itself, which
is also responsible for all the private readings delivered to the bidding oil majors.
Some works, like ours, dealt with equilibrium existence issues. Kajii and Ui [26] effec-
tively studied the alarmists’ game, albeit with finite action and state spaces. They showed
the existence of both action- and distribution-based equilibria; see, respectively, their Propo-
sitions 2 and 1. Moreover, Azrieli and Teper [5] treated what might be considered a special
satisfaction game. In its interim version, payoff-distribution vectors π are first turned into
expected-utility vectors
∫
un,tn ·dπ ≡ (
∫
un,tn ·d[π(ω)]|ω ∈ Ωn,tn) using utility functions un,tn.
The latter are then assessed using functionals say jn,tn . So for this game,
sn,tn(π) = jn,tn
(∫
un,tn · dπ
)
. (5)
Authors showed that quasi-concavity of the jn,tn ’s would lead to the existence of distribution-
based equilibria; see their Definition 2 which allows a player to maximize his action distribu-
tion instead of letting him fill the distribution’s support with optimal pure actions. Recently,
Grant, Meneghel, and Tourky [23] proposed the Savage game in which players possess prefer-
ences over strategy profiles made up of all players’ deterministic action plans. They identified
sufficient conditions for pure-equilibrium existence. We think that empowering players with
abilities to directly rank strategy profiles might have overstated actual players’ sophisticated-
ness, and have shifted too much burden from the game’s analysis to its setup. Our setup
where players have preferences over payoff- rather than strategy-related entities, besides be-
ing likely more realistic and parsimonious, avoids the issue pertaining to the observability of
other players’ strategies. Also, with randomization of actions intrinsic in our equilibria, we
need no special requirements on preferences to achieve existence results.
Riedel and Sass [42] allowed players to adjust ambiguities about the random devices used
in action generations. Their resultant Ellsberg equilibria generalized Nash equilibria. While
dealing with ambiguous mechanism design, Bose and Renou [8] assumed that each Ωt = {t}
and that players adopt (3) as their attitudes. Ambiguities have also been considered in
auctions; see, e.g., Lo [31] and Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape [7]. Meanwhile, the otherwise
traditional model of Milgrom and Weber [37] allowed bidders to waver on worths of the item.
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3 General Formulation
3.1 Game Primitives
Given space X with metric dX , we use B(X) for its Borel σ-field and P(X) for the space of
probabilities defined on the mesurable space (X,B(X)). The space P(X) is endowed with
the Prokhorov metric ψX , which also induces weak convergence. It will be separable when
X is. When the latter is compact, P(X) will be so too. Given metric spaces X and Y , let
C(X, Y ) be the space of continuous mappings from X to Y . Its members will be uniformly
continuous when X is compact; they will further be bounded when Y is the real line ℜ.
We let the finite N ≡ {1, ..., n¯} be the set of players. Each player n ∈ N is associated
with a finite type space Tn ≡ {1, ..., t¯n}. For convenience, we call player n with type tn the
(n, tn)-player. This player’s action comes from some metric space An,tn . Let T ≡
∏
n∈N Tn
be the space of type profiles and for each such profile t ≡ (tn)n∈N ∈ T , let At ≡
∏
n∈N An,tn
be the space of allowable action profiles under t.
Suppose metric space Ω hosts states of the world. Given n ∈ N , let (Ωn,tn)tn∈Tn be a
partition of Ω, with each Ωn,tn containing all states of the world that correspond to player
n’s type tn. Even when player n knows his type to be a certain tn, he should anticipate the
state of the world ω to potentially come from anywhere in Ωn,tn . Given t ≡ (tn)n∈N ∈ T , use
Ωt ≡
⋂
n∈N Ωn,tn for the set hosting all states of the world that correspond to each player n
his type tn. Spaces concerning the states of the world or in our own words, external factors,
can be “averaged away” from the modeler’s view if the traditional approach is taken. Here,
with general ambiguity attitudes being considered, they will not.
After introducing players, types, actions, and states of the world, we now turn to payoffs.
For n ∈ N and t ∈ T , let there be Borel-measurable functions rn,t ≡ rn,tn,t−n from At×Ωt to
some metric space Rn,tn , so that each rn,tn,t−n(a, ω) stands for the payoff to player n under
type profile t ≡ (tn, t−n), pure action profile a ≡ (an)n∈N ∈ At, and state of the world ω ∈ Ωt.
Note that the payoff spaces Rn,tn do not have to be one-dimensional real sets. When nothing
escapes a player’s notice, for instance, we could let Rn,tn = An,tn ×
∏
m6=n(
⋃
tm∈Tm
Am,tm) ×
Ωn,tn , and let each rn,tn,t−n be the identity map on At ×Ωt ≡ An,tn ×
∏
m6=nAm,tm × [Ωn,tn ∩
(
⋂
m6=n Ωm,tm)] being treated as from At × Ωt to the current superset Rn,tn . Even for this
extreme case, the abilities to rank opponents’ actions as implied by our preferences pose
much lower requirements than those of Grant, Meneghel, and Tourky [23], which amounted
to being able to rank opponents’ strategies.
Each player n, when seeing his type tn, will be able to tell that the actual realization ω is
in Ωn,tn ; however, nothing else, including opponents’ types, can be determined. During the
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game’s play where opponents mete out their behavioral strategies while the player himself
may or may not randomize on actions, he will face choices on payoff-distribution vectors of
the form π ≡ (π(ω)|ω ∈ Ωn,tn), where each component π(ω) is a member of P(Rn,tn).
It will become clear that Harsanyi’s [24] approach and by specialization, Nash’s [39][40]
as well, represent a very special view on how players should rank the payoff-distribution
vectors π. Here, we make generalizations. First, we just associate each (n, tn)-player with a
strict preference relation ≻n,tn on the space (P(Rn,tn))
Ωn,tn of such vectors. The relation is
merely required to be irreflexive and transitive, to the effect that
(I) π 6≻n,tn π for any π ∈ (P(Rn,tn))
Ωn,tn ;
(II) π ≻n,tn π
′′ whenever π ≻n,tn π
′ and π′ ≻n,tn π
′′.
For example, it might be that Ωn,tn = {hot day, cold day} andRn,tn = {ice cream, beef stew}.
Then, one ≻n,tn might dictate that “ice cream when it is hot and beef stew when it is cold”
is strictly preferred to “either type of food with a 50% chance on either type of a day”, which
is in turn strictly preferred to “beef stew when it is hot and ice cream when it is cold”.
We focus on the preference game Γ ≡ (N, (Tn)n∈N , (An,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn ,Ω, (Ωn,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn ,
(Rn,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn , (rn,t)n∈N,t∈T , (≻n,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn). To recap, N is the set of players, each Tn is
player n’s type space, and each An,tn is the action space of the (n, tn)-player; also, Ω is the
space for states of the world and each Ωn,tn contains states of the world that lead to player
n’s type tn; finally, each Rn,tn is the payoff space of the (n, tn)-player, each rn,t ≡ rn,tn,t−n is
that player’s payoff function from At ×Ωt to Rn,tn when opponents’ type profile happens to
be t−n, and each ≻n,tn is the preference relation adopted by the (n, t)-player.
3.2 Payoff-distribution Vectors
Every player n’s behavioral strategy δn can be understood as the vector (δn,tn)tn∈Tn , where
each component δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn ≡ P(An,tn) is a probability distribution over actions in An,tn .
That is, δn ∈ ∆n ≡
∏
tn∈Tn
∆n,tn . This way, δn offers a plan for player n on what potentially
randomized action to take under each type realization tn.
Let ∆ ≡
∏
n∈N ∆n be the space of all behavioral-strategy profiles covering all players.
To the (n, tn)-player, opponents’ type profile t−n ≡ (tm)m6=n may be anything from T−n ≡∏
m6=n Tm and their behavioral-strategy profile δ−n ≡ (δm)m6=n may be anything from ∆−n ≡∏
m6=n∆m. At each fixed t−n ∈ T−n, it is the δ−n,t−n ≡ (δm,tm)m6=n-portion of δ−n that will
materialize, and the state of the world ω must be from Ωtn,t−n . Note that (Ωtn,t−n)t−n∈T−n
forms a partition of Ωn,tn . In the following, we will take the liberty to use notation like
a( or δ)−n,t−n ≡ (a( or δ)m,tm)m6=n and A( or ∆)−n,t−n ≡
∏
m6=nA( or ∆)m,tm .
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As noted, there are two ways in which payoff-distribution vectors can be formed during
the play of a game where players’ random actions are verifiable and yet ambiguities exist on
external factors. The action-based case will emerge when each player has almost a free reign
on the actions to take except with the long-term goal of playing out a given randomized
strategy; meanwhile, the distribution-based case will arise when players use exogenously
generated random numbers to map out their chosen random strategies.
From the action-based perspective, the (n, tn)-player is in total command of his own
action whilst anticipating random actions from other players. Then, under his pure action
an,tn ∈ An,tn, opponent behavioral-strategy profile δ−n ≡ (δm,tm)m6=n,tm∈Tm ∈ ∆−n, opponent
type profile t−n ∈ T−n, and state ω ∈ Ωtn,t−n , the player will expect the payoff distribution
πan,tn,t−n(an,tn , δ−n,t−n, ω) =
(∏
m6=n
δm,tm
)
· (rn,tn,t−n(an,tn , ·, ω))
−1 ∈ P(Rn,tn). (6)
For any R′n,tn ∈ B(Rn,tn), the probability [π
a
n,tn,t−n(an,tn , δ−n,t−n, ω)](R
′
n,tn) equals∫
A−n,t−n
1({a−n,t−n with rn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ω) ∈ R
′
n,tn}) · [
∏
m6=n δm,tm ](da−n,t−n)
= (
∏
m6=n δm,tm)({a−n,t−n ∈ A−n,t−n |rn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ω) ∈ R
′
n,tn}),
(7)
where 1(·) stands for the indicator function. The above reflects how opponents’ random
actions result with the current player’s random payoff distribution. Assumptions to be
made in Section 4.1 will ensure that all operations in this and the ensuring Section 3.3
are legitimate. Had player n known his opponents’ type profile t−n ∈ T−n, he would have
anticipated the “|Ωtn,t−n|-dimensional” vector
πan,tn,t−n(an,tn , δ−n,t−n) ≡
(
πan,tn,t−n(an,tn , δ−n,t−n, ω)|ω ∈ Ωtn,t−n
)
. (8)
However, the player is unaware of opponents’ actual type profile. So he should contemplate
on the “|Ωn,tn |-dimensional” vector that is patched up from the vectors defined in (8):(
πan,tn,t−n(an,tn , δ−n,t−n)
)
t−n∈T−n
=
(
(πan,tn,t−n(an,tn , δ−n,t−n, ω)|ω ∈ Ωtn,t−n)
)
t−n∈T−n
=
(
πan,tn,t−n(an,tn , δ−n,t−n, ω)|ω ∈ Ωn,tn
)
,
(9)
where the second equality comes from Ωn,tn =
⋃
t−n∈T−n
Ωtn,t−n. The resulting payoff-
distribution vector πan,tn(an,tn , δ−n) is a member of (P(Rn,tn))
⋃
t−n∈T−n
Ωtn,t−n ≡ (P(Rn,tn))
Ωn,tn .
From the distribution-based perspective, the (n, tn)-player is in control of his behavioral
strategy. When he is committed to some δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn while other players have adopted
behavioral-strategy profile δ−n ∈ ∆−n, the player should, under opponent type profile t−n ∈
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T−n and state of the world ω ∈ Ωtn,t−n , anticipate the additionally mixed distribution
πdn,tn,t−n(δn,tn, δ−n,t−n , ω) =
(
δn,tn ×
∏
m6=n
δm,tm
)
· (rn,tn,t−n(·, ·, ω))
−1 ∈ P(Rn,tn). (10)
In view of (6) and (7), the above (10) could also be understood as
πdn,tn,t−n(δn,tn, δ−n,t−n , ω) =
∫
An,tn
πan,tn,t−n(an,tn, δ−n,t−n , ω) · δn,tn(dan,tn), (11)
in the sense that, for any R′n,tn ∈ B(Rn,tn),
[πdn,tn,t−n(δn,tn , δ−n,t−n, ω)](R
′
n,tn) =
∫
An,tn
[πan,tn,t−n(an,tn, δ−n,t−n , ω)](R
′
n,tn)·δn,tn(dan,tn). (12)
This just means that the payoff distribution under the (n, tn)-player’s action distribution
δn,tn is a mixture of the payoff distributions under the player’s pure actions. Now, let vector
πdn,tn(δn,tn , δ−n) be equated to(
πdn,tn,t−n(δn,tn , δ−n,t−n)
)
t−n∈T−n
≡
(
(πdn,tn,t−n(δn,tn , δ−n,t−n, ω)|ω ∈ Ωtn,t−n)
)
t−n∈T−n
=
(
πdn,tn,t−n(δn,tn, δ−n,t−n , ω)|ω ∈ Ωn,tn
)
,
(13)
i.e., the vector of all potential payoff distributions under opponent type profiles t−n ∈ T−n
and states of the world ω ∈ Ωtn,t−n . It is again a member of (P(Rn,tn))
Ωn,tn .
3.3 Equilibrium Definitions
The two perspectives lead to two equilibrium notions that can be different under general
ambiguity attitudes. In the action-based case, each player n should respond to any opponent
strategy profile δ−n by choosing action distribution δn,tn for each type realization tn that
gives no chance to any action an,tn whose corresponding vector π
a
n,tn(an,tn , δ−n) defined at (9)
could be less preferential than that of any other action. In the distribution-based case, the
player should choose action distribution δn,tn at each tn so that the corresponding vector
πdn,tn(δn,tn , δ−n) defined at (13) is not less preferential than that of any other distribution.
Start from the action-based perspective. For each player n ∈ N , type tn ∈ Tn, and
opponent strategy profile δ−n ∈ ∆−n, let Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n) be the set of actions an,tn that render
the vector πan,tn(an,tn, δ−n) as defined in (9) ≻n,tn-maximal:
Aˆan,tn(δ−n) =
{
an,tn ∈ An,tn|π
a
n,tn(a
′
n,tn, δ−n) 6≻n,tn π
a
n,tn(an,tn , δ−n) ∀a
′
n,tn ∈ An,tn
}
. (14)
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For any n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn, let best-response correspondence Bˆ
a
n,tn : ∆−n ⇒ ∆n,tn be such
that, for any opponent strategy profile δ−n ∈ ∆−n,
Bˆan,tn(δ−n) =
{
δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn |δn,tn(Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n)) = 1
}
, (15)
where Aˆan,tn(δ−n) has just been defined in (14). Thus, δn,tn will be considered one of the
(n, tn)-player’s best responses to δ−n when its support is made up of those an,tn ’s that render
πan,tn(an,tn , δ−n) ≻n,tn-maximal among all π
a
n,tn(a
′
n,tn , δ−n)’s.
Now define correspondence Bˆa : ∆⇒ ∆ from strategy profiles to themselves, so that
δ′ ∈ Bˆa(δ) if and only if δ′n,tn ∈ Bˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n) for any n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn. (16)
A behavioral-strategy profile δ ≡ (δn,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn ∈ ∆ ≡
∏
n∈N
∏
tn∈Tn
∆n,tn will be consid-
ered an action-based equilibrium of Γ if δ ∈ Bˆa(δ). For convenience, we use Ea ⊆ ∆ to
denote the set of all such equilibria.
Let us move on to the distribution-based perspective. For any player n ∈ N and type
tn ∈ Tn, define best-response correspondence Bˆ
d
n,tn : ∆−n ⇒ ∆n,tn so that, for any opponent
strategy profile δ−n ∈ ∆−n,
Bˆdn,tn(δ−n) =
{
δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn |π
d
n,tn(δ
′
n,tn , δ−n) 6≻n,tn π
d
n,tn(δn,tn , δ−n) ∀δ
′
n,tn ∈ ∆n,tn
}
. (17)
Here, a δn,tn will be considered one of the (n, tn)-player’s best responses to δ−n when
πdn,tn(δn,tn , δ−n) is ≻n,tn-maximal among all π
d
n,tn(δ
′
n,tn , δ−n)’s.
Now define correspondence Bˆd : ∆⇒ ∆ from strategy profiles to themselves, so that
δ′ ∈ Bˆd(δ) if and only if δ′n,tn ∈ Bˆ
d
n,tn(δ−n) for any n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn. (18)
A behavioral-strategy profile δ ∈ ∆ will be considered a distribution-based equilibrium of Γ
if δ ∈ Bˆd(δ). For convenience, we use Ed ⊆ ∆ to denote the set of all such equilibria.
When every type space Tn is a singleton, the game Γ will be normal-form. Then, all the
state spaces Ωt and Ωn,tn will be equatable to Ω; hence, all payoff-distribution vectors will
be of the same length. Certainly, no separate treatment is needed for this special case.
4 Existence and Continuity of Equilibria
4.1 Compactness and Continuity
Let us provide conditions under which the equilibrium sets Ea and Ed will be nonempty. We
first make the following assumptions related to compactness and continuity.
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Assumption 1 For any n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn, the action space An,tn is compact.
Assumption 2 The state space Ω is compact and for any type profile t ≡ (tn)n∈N ∈ T ≡∏
n∈N Tn, the subset Ωt ≡
⋂
n∈N Ωn,tn is closed and hence compact.
Assumption 3 For any n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn, the payoff space Rn,tn is compact.
Assumption 4 For any player n ∈ N and type profile t ∈ T , the payoff function rn,t from
At × Ωt ≡
∏
n∈N An,tn ×
⋂
n∈N Ωn,tn to Rn,tn is continuous.
Assumptions 1 to 4 are all quite routine. The only exception might be Assumption 2,
which requires that all the disjoint spaces Ωt be closed and hence “mutually distinguishable”.
But this is trivially satisfied by the case where Ωt = {t} × Ω˜ for some common space Ω˜.
By Assumption 1, each At ≡
∏
n∈N An,tn is compact. Also, all the action-distribution
spaces ∆n,tn ≡ P(An,tn), ∆−n,t−n ≡
∏
m6=n∆m,tm , ∆n ≡
∏
tn∈Tn
∆n,tn, ∆−n ≡
∏
m6=n∆m,
and ∆ ≡
∏
n∈N ∆n will be compact. By Assumption 2, each Ωn,tn ≡
⋃
t−n∈T−n
Ωtn,t−n is
compact. Consequently, all the state-distribution spaces P(Ωt), P(Ωn,tn), and P(Ω) will be
compact. With Assumption 3, we have the compactness of the payoff-distribution space
P(Rn,tn). Note that the payoff functions rn,t are defined on compact domains At × Ωt. Due
also to the continuity stated in Assumption 4, we can obtain some much needed continuity.
Proposition 1 For any n ∈ N , tn ∈ Tn, and t−n ∈ T−n, the function π
a
n,tn,t−n
defined at (6)
from An,tn × ∆−n,t−n × Ωtn,t−n to the payoff-distribution space P(Rn,tn) is continuous; also,
the function πdn,tn,t−n defined at (10) from ∆n,tn×∆−n,t−n×Ωtn,t−n to P(Rn,tn) is continuous.
Due to the compactness of all involved spaces, we can obtain from Proposition 1 the
uniform continuity of πan,tn,t−n and π
d
n,tn,t−n. So instead of (P(Rn,tn))
Ωtn,t−n , we can restrict the
vectors πan,tn,t−n(an,tn , δ−n,t−n) and π
d
n,tn,t−n(δn,tn, δ−n,t−n) defined in (8) and (13), respectively,
to the smaller C(Ωtn,t−n ,P(Rn,tn)), the space of all uniformly continuous mappings from
Ωtn,t−n to P(Rn,tn). Since the Ωt’s are closed and disjoint, we must have
dΩ(Ωt,Ωt′) > 0, ∀t, t
′ ∈ T with t 6= t′. (19)
This allows us to patch up aforementioned functions through all t−n’s to form π
a
n,tn(an,tn, δ−n)
and πdn,tn(δn,tn , δ−n) as members of Πn,tn ≡ C(Ωn,tn ,P(Rn,tn)). The payoff-distribution space
P(Rn,tn) is bounded since the Prokhorov metric ψRn,tn is always below 1. Now for the
product space (P(Rn,tn))
Ωn,tn , we can define the uniform metric, namely, the supremum of
all component-wise Prokhorov metrics on P(Rn,tn). Note that Πn,tn is a closed subset of
(P(Rn,tn))
Ωn,tn according to Theorem 43.6 of Munkres [38].
Moreover, uniform continuities stated in the above will lead to the following.
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Proposition 2 For any player n ∈ N and any of his types tn ∈ Tn, the vector-valued
functions πan,tn from An,tn ×∆−n to Πn,tn defined through (9) and π
d
n,tn from ∆n,tn ×∆−n to
Πn,tn defined through (13) are both continuous.
Proposition 2 propounds two points. First, not every map πan,tn(an,tn , δ−n) or π
d
n,tn(δn,tn , δ−n)
from states to payoff distributions will arise during any play of the preference game Γ; rather,
only those continuous ones will do. Second, the continuous mappings themselves will react
continuously to changes, in own actions an,tn and opponent behavioral-strategy profiles δ−n in
the action-based case and in own action distributions δn,tn and opponent behavioral-strategy
profiles δ−n in the distribution-based case.
4.2 Confined Definition of Preferences
Rather than defined for the entire space (P(Rn,tn))
Ωn,tn of payoff-distribution vectors, we
can confine each preference relation ≻n,tn to the smaller space Πn,tn ≡ C(Ωn,tn ,P(Rn,tn)) of
continuous payoff-distribution vectors. For convenience, define the set of pairs
ϕn,tn = {(π, π
′) ∈ Πn,tn × Πn,tn |π 6≻n,tn π
′} , (20)
where the left members are not less preferential than the right ones. With this definition,
an alternative way to express (14) is
Aˆan,tn(δ−n) =
{
an,tn ∈ An,tn |Π˜
a
n,tn(δ−n)× {π
a
n,tn(an,tn, δ−n)} ⊆ ϕn,tn
}
, (21)
where
Π˜an,tn(δ−n) =
[
πan,tn(·, δ−n)
]
(An,tn) ≡
{
πan,tn(a
′
n,tn , δ−n)|a
′
n,tn ∈ An,tn
}
, (22)
is the set of potential payoff-distribution vectors in Πn,tn to be experienced by the (n, tn)-
player when he tries all possible pure actions in An,tn while his opponents are fixated at the
behavioral-strategy profile δ−n. Meanwhile, an alternative way to express (17) is
Bˆdn,tn(δ−n) =
{
δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn |Π˜
d
n,tn(δ−n)× {π
d
n,tn(δn,tn , δ−n)} ⊆ ϕn,tn
}
, (23)
where
Π˜dn,tn(δ−n) =
[
πdn,tn(·, δ−n)
]
(∆n,tn) ≡
{
πdn,tn(δ
′
n,tn , δ−n)|δ
′
n,tn ∈ ∆n,tn
}
, (24)
is the set of potential payoff-distribution vectors in Πn,tn to be experienced by the (n, tn)-
player when he tries all possible action distributions in ∆n,tn while his opponents are fixated
at the behavioral-strategy profile δ−n.
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Due to πan,tn(·, δ−n)’s continuity as suggested by Proposition 2, the compactness of An,tn
will translate into that of Π˜an,tn(δ−n) defined at (22). Similarly, π
d
n,tn(·, δ−n)’s continuity and
∆n,tn ’s compactness will together lead to the compactness of Π˜
d
n,tn(δ−n) defined at (24). We
now make an assumption on the ≻n,tn ’s as they are defined on the spaces Πn,tn .
Preference Assumption 1 For any player n ∈ N and any of his types tn ∈ Tn, the relation
≻n,tn is continuous; namely, ϕn,tn defined in (20) is a closed subset of Πn,tn ×Πn,tn.
Preference Assumption 1 is routinely treated as part of the definition of a preference. We
single it out just to emphasize its importance. The following is an important consequence.
Proposition 3 For any player n ∈ N and any of his types tn ∈ Tn, a compact Π
′ ⊆ Πn,tn
can always reach ≻n,tn-maximal; that is, there exists some π ∈ Π
′ so that π′ 6≻n,tn π for any
π′ ∈ Π′, or in other words, Π′ × {π} ⊆ ϕn,tn.
This result is well known; see e.g., Lemma 2 of Schmeidler [44] and Theorem 5.1 of Khan
and Sun [28]. We reproduce it here for the sake of completeness.
4.3 Existence Derivations
In view of the compactness of Π˜an,tn(δ−n), Proposition 3 will lead to the nonemptiness of
Aˆan,tn(δ−n) as defined in (21). Indeed,[
πan,tn(·, δ−n)
] (
Aˆan,tn(δ−n)
)⋂
Π˜an,tn(δ−n) 6= ∅. (25)
Note that the nonempty Aˆan,tn(δ−n) is originally defined in (14). So we will have the nonempti-
ness of Bˆan,tn(δ−n) as well, because by (15), the latter contains the Dirac measure 1an,tn for any
an,tn ∈ Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n). Meanwhile, Preference Assumption 1 will together with the continuity of
πan,tn lead to the closedness of Aˆ
a
n,tn as a correspondence.
Proposition 4 Each Aˆan,tn(·) defined by (14) is closed as a correspondence.
It turns out that Proposition 4 will lead to the closedness of each correspondence Bˆan,tn
as defined in (15), from the space ∆−n of opponents’ behavioral strategies to the space ∆n,tn
of the (n, tn)-player’s behavioral strategies.
Proposition 5 Each Bˆan,tn defined by (15) is closed as a correspondence; also, each Bˆ
d
n,tn
defined by (17) is closed as a correspondence.
17
For the distribution-based case, the definition of Bˆdn,tn(·) in (17) is almost the same as
that of Aˆan,tn(·) in (14), except with the earlier an,tn, a
′
n,tn ∈ An,tn replaced by δn,tn, δ
′
n,tn ∈
∆n,tn . So starting from π
d
n,tn ’s continuity, we can follow almost the same steps to deduce the
nonemptiness of each Bˆdn,tn(δ−n).
Proposition 6 The sets Bˆa(δ) defined through (16) and Bˆd(δ) defined through (18) are
both nonempty at any behavioral-strategy profile δ ∈ ∆; in addition, both Bˆa and Bˆd are
closed as correspondences from ∆ to itself.
Coming back to the action-based case, the convexity of each Bˆan,tn(δ−n) is obvious from
its definition at (15). So via (16) each Bˆa(δ) is also convex. On the other hand, each ∆n,tn is
a compact and convex subset of the set of signed measures on An,tn , which is itself a locally
convex Hausdorff topological vector space. Thus, ∆ ≡
∏
n∈N ∆n ≡
∏
n∈N
∏
tn∈Tn
∆n,tn is also
a compact and convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space. This
makes the closedness of Bˆa in Proposition 6 equivalent to upper hemi-continuity. Therefore,
we can use the Fan-Glicksberg theorem to verify the existence of a fixed point for Bˆa.
Aside from convexity, the distribution-based case has almost all the properties enjoyed
by the action-based case as shown above. To move further, we consider ≻n,tn convex when
both π 6≻n,tn π
0 and π 6≻n,tn π
1 will ensure π 6≻n,tn (1−α)·π
0+α·π1 for any α ∈ [0, 1]. (26)
When ≻n,tn is complete, this concept is just ambiguity aversion seen in literature; see Schmei-
dler [45]. Now by (11) to (13), we have the linearity of πdn,tn(·, δ−n), that
πdn,tn [(1− α) · δ
0
n,tn + α · δ
1
n,tn , δ−n] = (1− α) · π
d
n,tn(δ
0
n,tn , δ−n) + α · π
d
n,tn(δ
1
n,tn , δ−n). (27)
In view of (17), Bˆdn,tn(δ−n) will be a convex subset of ∆n,tn when ≻n,tn is convex. Taking
similar steps to those for the action-based case, we can reach the existence of fixed points
for Bˆd as defined at (18). Summing up all of these, we can reach the following conclusion.
Theorem 1 The game Γ has action-based equilibria; that is, Ea 6= ∅. When ≻n,tn for every
player n ∈ N and any of his types tn ∈ Tn is a convex preference relation on Πn,tn, the game
will have distribution-based equilibria, so that Ed 6= ∅.
The extra condition needed by the second half of Theorem 1 somehow reflects on the
“rarity” of distribution-based equilibria in comparison to their action-based brethren.
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4.4 Continuity of Equilibria
Let Φn,tn be the space containing all closed sets of Πn,tn × Πn,tn that represent (n, tn)-
preferences. In view of (I) and (II) of each preference ≻n,tn ’s definition and (20) on each
ϕn,tn’s definition, Φn,tn is the collection of all closed sets ϕn,tn of Πn,tn × Πn,tn that satisfy:
(i) (π, π) ∈ ϕn,tn for any π ∈ Πn,tn ;
(ii) (π, π′′) /∈ ϕn,tn whenever (π, π
′) /∈ ϕn,tn and (π
′, π′′) /∈ ϕn,tn for any π, π
′, π′′ ∈ Πn,tn .
We can now treat ≻n,tn and ϕn,tn interchangeably. Recall that the metric dΠn,tn for the space
Πn,tn ≡ C(Ωn,tn ,P(Rn,tn)) of continuous payoff-distribution vectors is such that
dΠn,tn (π1, π2) = sup
ω∈Ωn,tn
ψRn,tn (π1(ω), π2(ω)), (28)
where ψRn,tn is the Prokhorov metric on the payoff-distribution space P(Rn,tn). We can then
define a metric dΠn,tn×Πn,tn for the vector-pair space Πn,tn ×Πn,tn by
dΠn,tn×Πn,tn ((π1, π
′
1), (π2, π
′
2)) = dΠn,tn (π1, π2) ∨ dΠn,tn (π
′
1, π
′
2). (29)
Let Fn,tn be the collection of nonempty closed subsets of Πn,tn×Πn,tn . Because of (i), Φn,tn
is a subset of Fn,tn. A metric dFn,tn for Fn,tn can be defined using the Hausdorff distance;
see, e.g., Hildenbrand [25] (Section B.II). For members F1 and F2 of Fn,tn,
dFn,tn (F1, F2) = inf (ǫ > 0|F1 ⊆ (F2)
ǫ and F2 ⊆ (F1)
ǫ) , (30)
where the ǫ-cover F ǫ of any F ∈ Fn,tn is given by
{
(π, π′) ∈ Πn,tn × Πn,tn |dΠn,tn×Πn,tn ((π, π
′), (π0, π
′
0)) ≤ ǫ for some (π0, π
′
0) ∈ F
}
. (31)
Proposition 7 The space Φn,tn of (n, tn)-preferences is a closed subset of Fn,tn.
Let Φ be
∏
n∈N
∏
tn∈Tn
Φn,tn and F be
∏
n∈N
∏
tn∈Tn
Fn,tn. On F , let us define the metric
dF so that for any members F ≡ (Fn,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn and F
′ ≡ (F ′n,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn of F ,
dF(F, F
′) = max
n∈N
max
tn∈Tn
dFn,tn (Fn,tn , F
′
n,tn). (32)
By Proposition 7, the space Φ of players’ ambiguity attitude profiles is a closed subset of F .
Our game is parameterized by ambiguity attitude profiles ϕ ≡ (ϕn,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn in Φ. To
make this dependence explicit, we revise definitions (14) through (18). First, (14) becomes
Aˆan,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) =
{
an,tn ∈ An,tn |Π˜
a
n,tn(δ−n)× {π
a
n,tn(an,tn , δ−n)} ⊆ ϕn,tn
}
, (33)
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with Π˜an,tn(δ−n) defined at (22), which is much like (21). Then, (15) becomes
Bˆan,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) =
{
δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn |δn,tn(Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn)) = 1
}
. (34)
Next, following (16), we have
Ea(ϕ) =
{
δ ≡ (δn,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn ∈ ∆|δn,tn ∈ Bˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) ∀n ∈ N, tn ∈ Tn
}
. (35)
Also, (17) becomes
Bˆdn,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) =
{
δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn |Π˜
d
n,tn(δ−n)× {π
d
n,tn(δn,tn , δ−n)} ⊆ ϕn,tn
}
, (36)
with Π˜dn,tn(δ−n) defined at (24), which is much like (23). Finally, following (18), we have
Ed(ϕ) =
{
δ ≡ (δn,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn ∈ ∆|δn,tn ∈ Bˆ
d
n,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) ∀n ∈ N, tn ∈ Tn
}
. (37)
We have upper hemi-continuity results that are stronger than Propositions 4 and 5.
Proposition 8 At each n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn, the correspondence Aˆ
a
n,tn(·|·) defined in (33)
from ∆−n × Φn,tn to An,tn is upper hemi-continuous.
Proposition 9 At each n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn, the correspondence Bˆ
a
n,tn(·|·) defined in (34)
from ∆−n×Φn,tn to ∆n,tn is upper hemi-continuous; also, the correspondence Bˆ
d
n,tn(·|·) defined
in (36) from ∆−n × Φn,tn to ∆n,tn is upper hemi-continuous.
These results would lead to the upper hemi-continuity of the equilbrium sets Ea and Ed
with respect to changing ambiguity attitude profiles.
Theorem 2 The correspondence Ea defined in (35) from Φ to ∆ is upper hemi-continuous;
also, the correspondence Ed defined in (37) from Φ to ∆ is upper hemi-continuous.
Theorem 2 dictates that equilibria of both types at a collection of players’ ambiguity
attitudes would somehow limit the choices that corresponding equilibria at neighboring col-
lections of ambiguity attitudes can have. In particular, both equilibrium sets are closed.
5 Special Cases
5.1 The Satisfaction Version
When the preference relations≻n,tn are negatively transitive so that π 6≻n,tn π
′ and π′ 6≻n,tn π
′′
always lead to π 6≻n,tn π
′′, the relations 6≻n,tn will become complete pre-orderings. That is,
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they will be reflexive, transitive, and complete, the latter of which in the sense that either
π 6≻n,tn π
′ or π′ 6≻n,tn π for any π, π
′ ∈ Πn,tn . Then, it will not take much for order-preserving
utility functions over payoff distributions to emerge; see, e.g., Debreu [12].
We suppose such is the case, so that each preference relation ≻n,tn is facilitated by a
function sn,tn through (1) for any continuous payoff-distribution vectors π, π
′ ∈ Πn,tn . We call
these sn,tn ’s satisfaction functions; also, let us call the game Γ, with the sn,tn’s substantiating
the ≻n,tn ’s, a satisfaction game. Define
san,tn(an,tn , δ−n) ≡ sn,tn
(
πan,tn(an,tn , δ−n)
)
, (38)
and
sdn,tn(δn,tn, δ−n) ≡ sn,tn
(
πdn,tn(δn,tn , δ−n)
)
. (39)
According to (1), as well as (14) to (16), δ ∈ ∆ will be considered an action-based equilibrium
of the satisfaction game if and only if for any player n ∈ N and type tn ∈ Tn,
δn,tn
(
{an,tn ∈ An,tn |s
a
n,tn(an,tn , δ−n) ≥ s
a
n,tn(a
′
n,tn , δ−n) ∀a
′
n,tn ∈ An,tn}
)
= 1. (40)
By (1), (17), and (18), it will be considered a distribution-based equilibrium of the game if
and only if for any player n ∈ N and type tn ∈ Tn,
sdn,tn(δn,tn , δ−n) ≥ s
d
n,tn(δ
′
n,tn , δ−n), ∀δ
′
n,tn ∈ ∆n,tn . (41)
According to (40), an action-based equilibrium δa ∈ Ea ⊆ ∆ for the satisfaction game Γ
is one that, at any n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn, the action distribution δ
a
n,tn has its support built on
those actions aan,tn that achieve maxan,tn∈An,tn s
a
n,tn(an,tn , δ
a
−n). Meanwhile, according to (41),
a distribution-based equilibrium δd ∈ Ed ⊆ ∆ for the game is one that, at any n ∈ N and
tn ∈ Tn, the action distribution δ
d
n,tn achieves maxδn,tn∈∆n,tn s
d
n,tn(δn,tn , δ
d
−n). For equilibrium
existence, let us make a continuity-related assumption.
Satisfaction Assumption 1 For any player n ∈ N and any of his types tn ∈ Tn, the
satisfaction function sn,tn is continuous from Πn,tn to the real line ℜ.
This assumption will imply Preference Assumption 1. So for a satisfaction game, ex-
istence of action-based equilibria is guaranteed by Theorem 1. Also, with (1), the ≻n,tn-
convexity requirement (26) will be equivalent to
when both sn,tn(π) ≤ sn,tn(π
0) and sn,tn(π) ≤ sn,tn(π
1),
it will follow that sn,tn(π) ≤ sn,tn((1− α) · π
0 + α · π1) for any α ∈ [0, 1].
(42)
But this exactly expresses the quasi-concavity of sn,tn . Thus, the existence of distribution-
based will be guaranteed by Theorem 1 as well under quasi-concave sn,tn ’s.
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Corollary 1 The satisfaction game Γ has action-based equilibria. When the satisfaction
functions sn,tn are quasi-concave, the game will have distribution-based equilibria as well.
The quasi-concavity of the satisfaction function sn,tn translates into the added benefit
bestowed to the (n, tn)-player when two payoff-distribution vectors are mixed up. Thus,
Corollary 1 basically stipulates the nonemptiness of Ea for a general satisfaction game and
that of Ed under ambiguity aversion. The latter message can be used to explain Azrieli and
Teper’s [5] conclusions for their setting. Since
∫
un,tn · dπ ≡ (
∫
un,tn · d[π(ω)]|ω ∈ Ωn,tn) is
linear in π, the quasi-concavity of jn,tn used in (5) will lead to that of its corresponding sn,tn .
5.2 The Alarmists’ and Enterprising Versions
Suppose at each player n ∈ N and type tn ∈ Tn, there exist a real-valued utility function
un,tn ∈ C(Rn,tn ,ℜ) over payoffs and a closed prior set Pn,tn ⊆ P(Ωn,tn) of potential state
distributions, so that for any payoff-distribution vector π ∈ Πn,tn , (3) applies with
s0n,tn(π, ρ) =
∫
Ωn,tn
{
∫
Rn,tn
un,tn(r) · [π(ω)](dr)} · ρ(dω). (43)
The above integration can be understood as an expectation of the utility un,tn(R) over the
random payoff R, where the latter is distributed according to
∫
Ωn,tn
π(ω) · ρ(dω), essentially
components π(ω) of the vector π mixed over with weights assigned by the state distribution
ρ. We will call this even more special Γ an alarmists’ game, because players are effectively
on the highest alert to guard against the worst scenario. Under the convexity of Pn,tn and
other technical restrictions, (3) and (43) were demonstrated by Gilboa and Schmeidler [22]
to reflect features like certainty independence, continuity, monotonicity, ambiguity aversion,
and non-degeneracy to be possessed by the underlying preference relation ≻n,tn .
The utility function un,tn ∈ C(Rn,tn ,ℜ) is not only continuous but also bounded due to
the compactness of Rn,tn . This along with the continuity of π(·) ∈ Πn,tn ≡ C(Ωn,tn ,P(Rn,tn))
and the nature of the Prokhorov metric will ensure the continuity of
∫
Rn,tn
un,tn(r) · [π(·)](dr)
as a function from Ωn,tn to ℜ:
lim
ω′→ω
∫
Rn,tn
un,tn(r) · [π(ω
′)](dr) =
∫
Rn,tn
un,tn(r) · [π(ω)](dr), (44)
just because limω′→ω π(ω
′) = π(ω). So the outer-layer integration in (43) is well defined.
Similarly,
∫
Rn,tn
un,tn(r) · [π(ω)](dr) is continuous in π(ω) at every ω ∈ Ωn,tn . It is also
bounded across all these ω’s. Moreover, the uniform metric adopted for Πn,tn means that
limk→+∞ π
k = π always entails limk→+∞ π
k(ω) = π(ω) at every ω ∈ Ωn,tn . With bounded
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convergence, we will then have s0n,tn(·, ρ)’s continuity as a real-valued function on Πn,tn . Since
the feasible region Pn,tn in the optimization problem involved in (3) is independent of π, we
can immediately deduce the continuity of sn,tn. In addition, s
0
n,tn(·, ρ) is linear in the sense
of being both concave and convex. Hence, after taking infimum, sn,tn will be concave. The
following then comes immediately from Corollary 1.
Corollary 2 The alarmists’ game Γ has both action- and distribution-based equilibria.
Kajii and Ui [26] can be understood as studying the alarmists’ game with finite action
and state spaces. They also listed different ways in which prior sets Pn,tn ⊆ P(Ωn,tn) used
in (3) could be generated from prior sets Pn ⊆ P(Ω) defined for the entire state space; e.g.,
through the fashion of Dempster [13] or the fashion of Fagin and Halpern [20].
Oppositely, we can consider what we shall call the enterprsing game, where (4) applies.
If the alarmists’ game reflects aversion to ambiguity on the actual distribution of states of
the world ω within the Ωn,tn ’s, the enterprising game reflects players’ staunch beliefs in the
tendency for ambiguities to be resolved in a manner most favorable to them. In other words,
the players are really “enterprising”. The current sn,tn, being linked to s
0
n,tn through (4), is
continuous. The following thus applies.
Corollary 3 The enterprising game Γ has action-based equilibria.
In Appendix C, we will have more to say about this game’s pure equilibria, in both
action- and distribution-based senses.
5.3 The Traditional Expected-utility Version
A special game, which is simultaneously alarmists’ and enterprising, is when the prior sets
Pn,tn happen to be singletons {ρn,tn}. Then Γ’s satisfaction functions will obey
sn,tn(π) = s
0
n,tn(π, ρn,tn), ∀π ∈ Πn,tn, (45)
with s0n,tn given in (43). Note this agrees exactly with (2). This special case turns out just
to be the incomplete-information game as understood in the traditional sense.
Let us suppose that
pn,tn|t−n ≡
∫
Ωtn,t−n
ρn,tn(dω) > 0, ∀n ∈ N, t ≡ (tn, t−n) ∈ T. (46)
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Since Ωn,tn =
⋃
t−n∈T−n
Ωtn,t−n,∑
t−n∈T−n
pn,tn|t−n =
∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
Ωtn,t−n
ρn,tn(dω) =
∫
Ωn,tn
ρn,tn(dω) = 1, (47)
with the last equality attributable to ρn,tn ∈ P(Ωn,tn). So pn,tn ≡ (pn,tn|t−n)t−n∈T−n describes
a distribution on opponents’ type profiles, wherein every component pn,tn|t−n is interpretable
as player n’s estimate on the chance for t−n to occur at his own type tn. Also, let
vn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n) ≡
∫
Ωtn,t−n
un,tn
(
rn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ω)
)
· νn,tn,t−n(dω), (48)
where
νn,tn,t−n ≡
1
pn,tn|t−n
· ρn,tn |Ωtn,t−n ∈ P(Ωtn,t−n). (49)
Here, ρn,tn |Ωtn,t−n just means the measure ρn,tn on Ωn,tn being confined to the subset Ωtn,t−n .
We can treat each term vn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n) as player n’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
when his own type is tn, his opponents’ type profile is t−n, he takes action an,tn , and his
opponents collectively adopt action profile a−n,t−n .
By plugging (6) to (9) into (43), we see that s0n,tn(π
a
n,tn(an,tn , δ−n), ρn,tn) equals∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
Ωtn,t−n
{
∫
Rn,tn
un,tn(r) · [π
a
n,tn,t−n
(an,tn, δ−n,t−n , ω)](dr)} · ρn,tn(dω)
=
∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
Ωtn,t−n
ρn,tn(dω)×
×{
∫
Rn,tn
un,tn(r) · [(
∏
m6=n δm,tm) · (rn,tn,t−n(an,tn , ·, ω))
−1](dr)},
(50)
which, after a change of variables, an exchange of integration orders, and the use of entities
defined in (46) through (49), would become∑
t−n∈T−n
pn,tn|t−n ·
∫
A−n,t−n
vn,tn,t−n(an,tn, a−n,t−n) ·
∏
m6=n
δm,tm(dam,tm). (51)
Similarly, by plugging (10) to (13) into (43) and (51), we can get
s0n,tn
(
πdn,tn(δn,tn , δ−n), ρn,tn
)
=
∫
An,tn
s0n,tn
(
πan,tn(an,tn , δ−n), ρn,tn
)
· δn,tn(dan,tn). (52)
From (50) to (52), we see that among Γ’s primitives listed at the end of Section 3.1, Ω,
(Ωn,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn , (Rn,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn, (rn,t)n∈N,t∈T , and (≻n,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn are all not needed. In
their stead, we can add the probabilities pn,tn|t−n and the real-valued payoffs vn,tn,t−n(an,tn ,
a−n,t−n)’s. These descriptions fit the definition of a traditional game with incomplete infor-
mation, albeit one without necessarily involving a common prior. Since the current one is a
special alarmists’ game, we know from Corollary 2 that both action- and distribution-based
equilibria are in existence. In Section 6, we shall see that the linearity of s0n,tn(·, ρn,tn) will
lead the two types of equilibria to exactly overlap.
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6 Relations between Equilibrium Versions
6.1 Useful Definitions
We now come to relationships between Ea and Ed. Some of the conditions concerning the
general preference game might be difficult to check. However, they lead to a clear message
about the satisfaction game and ultimately, to the identity of the two equilibrium sets for
the traditional game. Given metric spaces X , Y , and Z, let K(X, Y, Z) be the space of
continuous kernels, so that every κ ≡ (κ(x)|x ∈ X) ≡ (κ(x, y)|x ∈ X, y ∈ Y ) ∈ K(X, Y, Z)
is a mapping from X × Y to P(Z) that also satisfies the following:
(a) [κ(·, y)](Z ′) is Borel-measurable from X to [0, 1] at every y ∈ Y and Z ′ ∈ B(Z);
(b) κ is continuous from X × Y to P(Z).
Given δ ∈ P(X), we define the integration ι =
∫
X
κ(x) ·δ(dx) in the component-wise fashion,
so that ι ≡ (ι(y)|y ∈ Y ) and ι(y) =
∫
X
κ(x, y) · δ(dx) at every y ∈ Y ; each of the latter
integrations, in turn, is facilitated by
[ι(y)](Z ′) =
∫
X
[κ(x, y)](Z ′) · δ(dx), ∀Z ′ ∈ B(Z). (53)
Due to (a), the above integration can be carried out. Using (a) and part of (b), we can
establish ι’s membership in C(Y,P(Z)).
Lemma 1 Given κ ∈ K(X, Y, Z) and δ ∈ P(X), their integration ι, whose definition ulti-
mately relies on (53), is a member of C(Y,P(Z)).
At each (n, tn)-pair, it will help to cast the action space An,tn as X , state space Ωn,tn as
Y , and payoff space Rn,tn as Z. We now show that payoffs attained in the action-based sense
are linked to continuous kernels. Given δ−n ∈ ∆−n, with each π
a
n,tn(an,tn, δ−n) being patched
up in the manner of (9), we can understand the vector πan,tn(δ−n) ≡ (π
a
n,tn(an,tn , δ−n)|an,tn ∈
An,tn) ≡ (π
a
n,tn,t−n
(an,tn, δ−n,t−n , ω)|an,tn ∈ An,tn , t−n ∈ T−n, ω ∈ Ωtn,t−n) as a mapping from
An,tn × Ωn,tn to P(Rn,tn). It turns out to be a continuous kernel.
Proposition 10 At any player n ∈ N , any of his types tn ∈ Tn, and any of his opponents’
behavioral-strategy profiles δ−n ∈ ∆−n, we have π
a
n,tn(δ−n) ∈ K(An,tn ,Ωn,tn , Rn,tn).
Comparing (12) with (53), we can have another understanding of the vector πdn,tn(δn,tn , δ−n)
defined earlier at (13). Using the current integration of continuous kernels,
πdn,tn(δn,tn , δ−n) =
∫
An,tn
πan,tn(an,tn , δ−n) · δn,tn(dan,tn). (54)
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Lemma 1 would also predict the vector’s membership in Πn,tn ≡ C(Ωn,tn , Rn,tn).
For any preference relation ϕn,tn ∈ Φn,tn , let W
a
n,tn(ϕn,tn) be the set that contains all
the (κn,tn , δn,tn)-pairs so that κn,tn ≡ (κn,tn(an,tn)|an,tn ∈ An,tn) is a continuous kernel in
K(An,tn ,Ωn,tn , Rn,tn), δn,tn is an action distribution in ∆n,tn, and the two satisfy
δn,tn
(
{an,tn ∈ An,tn|(κn,tn(a
′
n,tn), κn,tn(an,tn)) ∈ ϕn,tn ∀a
′
n,tn ∈ An,tn}
)
= 1, (55)
where the set being assessed by δn,tn is necessarily a member of B(An,tn). Basically, any
(κn,tn , δn,tn) ∈ W
a
n,tn(ϕn,tn) is such that the payoff-distribution vector κn,tn(an,tn) achieves
ϕn,tn-maximality among all κn,tn(a
′
n,tn)’s for δn,tn-almost every an,tn .
Also, let Wdn,tn(ϕn,tn) be the set that contains all the (κn,tn , δn,tn)-pairs so that κn,tn is a
continuous kernel in K(An,tn ,Ωn,tn , Rn,tn), δn,tn is an action distribution in ∆n,tn , and(∫
An,tn
κn,tn(an,tn) · δ
′
n,tn(dan,tn),
∫
An,tn
κn,tn(an,tn) · δn,tn(dan,tn)
)
∈ ϕn,tn , (56)
for any δ′n,tn ∈ ∆n,tn . By Lemma 1, the integrals are members of Πn,tn . Basically, any
(κn,tn , δn,tn) ∈ W
d
n,tn(ϕn,tn) is such that the integrated payoff-distribution vector
∫
An,tn
κn,tn(an,tn)·
δn,tn(dan,tn) achieves ϕn,tn-maximality among all the
∫
An,tn
κn,tn(an,tn) · δ
′
n,tn(dan,tn)’s when
δ′n,tn traverses through the entire action-distribution space ∆n,tn .
Comparing (33) and (34) with (55), we can understand δn,tn ∈ Bˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) as((
πan,tn(an,tn, δ−n)|an,tn ∈ An,tn
)
, δn,tn
)
∈ Wan,tn(ϕn,tn). (57)
Comparing (36) with (54) and (56), we can understand δn,tn ∈ Bˆ
d
n,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) as((
πan,tn(an,tn, δ−n)|an,tn ∈ An,tn
)
, δn,tn
)
∈ Wdn,tn(ϕn,tn). (58)
6.2 Behavioral Equilibria in General
When Wdn,tn(ϕn,tn) ⊆ W
a
n,tn(ϕn,tn), we say that preference relation ϕn,tn ∈ Φn,tn is individ-
ually prominent with respect to An,tn . As can be seen from (55) and (56), this property
entails that κn,tn(an,tn) being not ϕn,tn-maximal among all the κn,tn(a
′
n,tn) for a δn,tn-positive
set of an,tn ’s would lead to some action distribution δ
′
n,tn for
∫
An,tn
κn,tn(a) · δ
′
n,tn(da) to be
strictly more preferable than
∫
An,tn
κn,tn(a) · δn,tn(da). It will result in the following.
Proposition 11 For the preference game Γ, we will have Ed ⊆ Ea when every preference
relation ϕn,tn ∈ Φn,tn is individually prominent with respect to An,tn.
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Oppositely, when Wan,tn(ϕn,tn) ⊆ W
d
n,tn(ϕn,tn), we say that preference relation ϕn,tn ∈
Φn,tn is mixture-preserving with respect to An,tn . By (55) and (56), this is when κn,tn(an,tn)
being ϕn,tn-maximal among all the κn,tn(a
′
n,tn)’s for δn,tn-almost every an,tn would lead to∫
An,tn
κn,tn(a) · δn,tn(da) being ϕn,tn-maximal among all the
∫
An,tn
κn,tn(a) · δ
′
n,tn(da)’s. The
property plays a decisive role in the other direction of equilibrium-set inclusion.
Proposition 12 For the preference game Γ, we will have Ea ⊆ Ed when every preference
relation ϕn,tn ∈ Φn,tn is mixture-preserving with respect to An,tn.
When the relations ϕn,tn are facilitated by satisfaction functions sn,tn, we will show that
individual prominence is linked to ambiguity seeking. Meanwhile, mixture preservation seems
more stringent as so far its guarantors involve both ambiguity aversion and seeking. In
this backdrop, Propositions 11 and 12 may be found to be consistent with the notion that
distribution-based equilibria are “rarer” than their action-based counterparts.
Due to (b), any continuous kernel κn,tn ∈ K(An,tn ,Ωn,tn , Rn,tn) can be viewed as a contin-
uous mapping from An,tn to Πn,tn ≡ C(Ωn,tn ,P(Rn,tn)). Now consider satisfaction function
sn,tn defined on Πn,tn that meets Satisfaction Assumption 1, i.e., the continuity of sn,tn as a
function from Πn,tn to ℜ. Then, sn,tn(κn,tn(·)) is a continuous and hence measurable map-
ping from An,tn to ℜ. We say such sn,tn strongly concave with respect to An,tn when for any
continuous kernel κn,tn ∈ K(An,tn ,Ωn,tn , Rn,tn) and action distribution δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn ,
sn,tn
(∫
An,tn
κn,tn(an,tn) · δn,tn(dan,tn)
)
≥
∫
An,tn
sn,tn(κn,tn(an,tn)) · δn,tn(dan,tn). (59)
We say sn,tn strongly convex with respect to An,tn when the inequality opposite to (59) is
always true. We say sn,tn strongly linear with respect to An,tn when it is both strongly concave
and convex with respect to An,tn. Here come the links between sn,tn’s strong properties and
earlier notions about the sn,tn-based preference relation ϕn,tn.
Proposition 13 With respect to the same An,tn, any preference relation ϕn,tn ∈ Φn,tn that
is based on a strongly convex satisfaction function sn,tn will be individually prominent.
Proposition 14 With respect to the same An,tn, any preference relation ϕn,tn ∈ Φn,tn that
is based on a strongly linear satisfaction function sn,tn will be both individually prominent
and mixture-preserving.
So far, we have not found any intermediate result which guarantees mixture preservation
without ensuring individual prominence. On the other hand, strong concavity/convexity
27
of sn,tn with respect to An,tn is certainly stronger than sn,tn’s ordinary concavity/convexity
except when An,tn is a singleton, at which time the strong properties reduce to truisms. The
converse is actually true when the payoff space Rn,tn is finite.
Proposition 15 For any player n ∈ N and any of his types tn ∈ Tn, suppose the pay-
off space Rn,tn is finite; also, suppose sn,tn is a satisfaction function over Πn,tn that meets
Satisfaction Assumption 1. Then, its ordinary concavity/convexity will lead to its strong
concavity/convexity.
Confine to the case where the payoff spaces Rn,tn are finite. Combining Propositions 11, 13,
and 15, we see that Ed ⊆ Ea will happen when the satisfaction functions are convex; whereas,
combining everything from Propositions 11, 12, 14, and 15, we see that both the previous
and Ea ⊆ Ed will happen when satisfaction functions are linear. We can now reach the
following for the satisfaction game introduced in Section 5.1.
Theorem 3 For the satisfaction game Γ with finite payoff spaces Rn,tn, we have E
d ⊆ Ea 6=
∅ when the satisfaction functions sn,tn are convex; furthermore, we have E
d = Ea 6= ∅ when
the functions are linear.
Note that Ea 6= ∅ is attributable to Corollary 1. Now the message is clear for the
satisfaction game. Any distribution-based equilibrium will be an action-based one when all
players are ambiguity-seeking. When viewing Theorem 3 in conjunction with Corollary 1,
we may speculate that distribution-based equilibria are “easier” to come by when players are
“more” ambiguity-averse. The theorem also leads to more understanding on the enterprising
game studied in Section 5.2.
Corollary 4 For the enterprising game Γ with finite payoff spaces, Ed ⊆ Ea 6= ∅.
Although the nonemptiness of Ea is guaranteed, so far that for the enterprising game’s
Ed remains unclear. On the other hand, as shall be clear in Appendix C, ambiguity seeking
will not prevent distribution-based equilibria from emerging. For the traditional game, we
can obtain a general result on equilibrium equivalence by appealing to Propositions 11 to 14.
Theorem 4 In the traditional game Γ, all the satisfaction functions sn,tn are strongly linear
with respect to the corresponding action spaces An,tn. Consequently, E
d = Ea 6= ∅.
Theorem 4 offers the justification on why traditionally, one does not have to worry much
about how behavioral equilibria are interpreted and enforced.
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6.3 Pure Equilibria in Particular
When focusing on pure equilibria where players do not use chance outcomes in their own
strategies, we can reach simple conclusions without resorting to finite payoff spaces. When
action distribution δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn happens to be the Dirac measure 1an,tn concentrating on one
pure action an,tn ∈ An,tn , we have from (11) and (12) that
πdn,tn,t−n(1an,tn , δ−n,t−n, ω) = π
a
n,tn,t−n(an,tn, δ−n,t−n , ω). (60)
So in view of (9) and (13),
πdn,tn(1an,tn , δ−n) = π
a
n,tn(an,tn , δ−n). (61)
This simple observation would render it necessary that a pure distribution-based equilib-
rium is also a pure action-based equilibrium. Let 1An,tn ≡ {1an,tn |an,tn ∈ An,tn}, 1An ≡∏
tn∈Tn
1An,tn , and 1A ≡
∏
n∈N 1An. The last is the space of all pure strategy profiles.
Theorem 5 For the preference game Γ, we have 1A ∩ E
d ⊆ 1A ∩ E
a.
Let us revisit the enterprising game defined in Section 5.2. Recall the definition of san,tn
at (38) and that of sdn,tn at (39).
Proposition 16 It is true that san,tn(an,tn , δ−n) = s
d
n,tn(1an,tn , δ−n).
When the action spaces An,tn are finite, the behavioral-strategy spaces ∆n,tn are simplices
embedded in ℜAn,tn . Then, pure strategies in 1An,tn constitute all extreme points of ∆n,tn .
As the supremums of convex functions over convex sets come from extreme points,
sup
δ′n,tn∈1An,tn
sdn,tn(δ
′
n,tn , δ−n) = sup
δ′n,tn∈∆n,tn
sdn,tn(δ
′
n,tn , δ−n). (62)
For a more general case, we resort to the following result.
Lemma 2 Suppose X is a compact subset of a finite-dimensional real Euclidean space and
f is a continuous and convex real-valued function defined on P(X). Then, supξ∈P(X) f(ξ)
can be achieved at the Dirac measure 1x for some x ∈ X.
In the enterprising game Γ, we now suppose that all action spaces An,tn are compact
subsets of finite-dimensional real Euclidean spaces. Note that sdn,tn(·, δ−n) is not only convex
but also continuous. For the latter, just follow the continuity of πdn,tn(·, δ−n) as stated in
Proposition 2, sdn,tn(·, δ−n)’s definition at (39), and the continuity of the sn,tn defined at (4)
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that was covered right before Corollary 3. By identifying the function sdn,tn(·, δ−n) with f
in Lemma 2 and the set An,tn with X in the lemma, we can again reach (62). This and
the earlier Proposition 16 turn out to be pivotal for the opposite of either Corollary 4 or
Theorem 5. We can obtain the following when all these are combined.
Theorem 6 For the enterprising game Γ, we have 1A ∩ E
d = 1A ∩ E
a.
According to Theorem 6, there will be a unified set 1E ≡ 1A ∩ E
d = 1A ∩ E
a of pure
equilibria for the enterprising game when action spaces are mildly regulated. For a special
case which involves strategic complementarities to be detailed in Appendix C, not only is 1E
nonempty, but we can also identify from it those well-behaving ones.
7 Auctions with Ambiguities on Item’s Worth
7.1 A Framework for Auctions
Let us treat a single-item auction. Here, players are bidders and they may only receive
crude signals about the actual worths to them and others of the item being auctioned. For
each player n ∈ N ≡ {1, ..., n¯}, let type space Tn ≡ {1, ..., t¯n} denote the set of signals
that player n can receive. A compact metric space Ω, decomposable into (Ωn,tn)tn∈Tn for
any n ∈ N and into (Ωt)t∈T with each Ωt equal to
⋂
n∈N Ωn,tn , holds states of the world.
To an (n, tn)-bidder, ω can come from anywhere in Ωn,tn prior to the auction. Players’
ambiguity attitudes are expressible by preference relations ≻n,tn , which may or may not
be substantiated by satisfaction functions sn,tn, which may or may not be substantiated by
utility functions un,tn and prior sets Pn,tn in “inf”- or “sup”-fashions, and so on and so forth.
In our framework, what set an auction apart from any other incomplete-information
game are its action spaces An,tn and payoff functions rn,tn,t−n . For each (n, tn)-bidder, let
real compact interval An,tn ≡ [an,tn , an,tn] hold prices that the bidder can offer. For any
type profile t ≡ (tn)n∈N ∈ T ≡
∏
n∈N Tn, action profile at ≡ (an,tn)n∈N ∈
∏
n∈N An,tn , and
potential state of the world ω ∈ Ωt, let ιn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ω) be the 0-1 indicator on
whether or not player n is the one who wins the item. Since at most one bidder can win out
of any (t, at, ω)-combination, we require that∑
n∈N
ιn,tn,t−n(an,tn, a−n,t−n , ω) = 0 or 1. (63)
We also use τn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ω) for the (n, tn)-bidder’s payment to the auctioneer. When
losers have to pay as well, it can be nonzero even when ιn,tn,t−n(an,tn, a−n,t−n , ω) = 0. In
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addition, let υn,tn,t−n(ω) be the actual worth of the item to the bidder when the external
factor turns out to be ω. The payoff rn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ω) equals
ιn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ω) · υn,tn,t−n(ω)− τn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ω). (64)
This reflects that a bidder will earn the difference between the item’s actual worth and his
payment when he wins the bid, and otherwise he will still make a payment.
Auction models of both Lo [31] and Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape [7] incorporated ambi-
guity. However, bidders there are fully aware of the item’s true worths to themselves, which
also happen to be independent of other bidders’ value assessments. The current framework
allows for more flexibilities. First, bidders’ ambiguity attitudes can be expressed by multiple
priors along with (3) or (4), or more general satisfaction functions, or even mere preference
relations. Second, types may convey just what bidders can receive prior to bidding, while
the state space Ω can contain more information on factors that influence the item’s eventual
worth to the winner. Third, the functions ιn,tn,t−n , νn,tn,t−n , and τn,tn,t−n can take various
forms to suit particular modeling needs.
For the most general case, we can use Theorem 1 to predict that action-based equilibria,
likely of the mixed nature, would exist. If bidders are alarmists, we can also predict the
existence of distribution-based equilibria through Corollary 1. Under more auction-specific
assumptions, however, we may hope to obtain results regarding the existence of pure equi-
libria of either type, their behaviors with respect to changing bidder types, and comparative
statics properties of theirs when model primitives alter. Bidders in an auction are likely to
be enterprising. If such is the case, then according to Theorem 6, we would not even have
to distinguish between the two types of equilibria when they are pure.
7.2 A Concrete Example
For a concrete example, consider a case where all type spaces Tn are the same {1, ..., t¯}. Also,
regardless of the bidder identity n and type tn, the action space is the same real interval
An,tn ≡ [0, w¯]. Here, w¯ serves as the highest possible worth of the item. The state space
Ω is Ψn¯ × {1, ..., t¯}
n¯ × [0, w¯]n¯, where Ψn¯ contains all the n¯! permutations ψ ≡ (ψn)n=1,...,n¯
of the numbers 1, ..., n¯. Every element ω ∈ Ω can be understood as the tuple (ψ, t, w) ≡
((ψn)n=1,...,n¯, (tn)n=1,...,n¯, (wn)n=1,...,n¯), where ψ ≡ (ψn)n=1,...,n¯ is potentially useful during the
auction for tie-breaking purposes and to each bidder n, tn is the signal he receives before the
auction and wn is the true worth of the item to him. For each type profile t ≡ (tn)n=1,...,n¯ ∈
{1, ..., t¯}n¯, the Ωt is merely Ψn¯×{t}×[0, w¯]
n¯. This is the space of all states of the world ω when
bidders’ private types are known to form t. When bidder n only knows his own type tn, the
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state ω would come from Ωn,tn =
⋃
t−n∈{1,...,t¯}n¯−1
Ωtn,t−n = {tn}×(Ψn¯ × {1, ..., t¯}
n¯−1 × [0, w¯]n¯).
So bidder n could have ambiguity on the way in which ties are broken, other bidders’ types,
and true valuations of all bidders including his own.
We let ιn,tn,t−n(an,tn, a−n,t−n , ω) = 1 if an,tn > am,tm for any m 6= n or if an,tn ≥ am,tm
for any m 6= n while ω = (ψ, t, w) is such that ψn ≤ ψm − 1 whenever am,tm = an,tn . This
satisfies (63) and reflects that the item goes to the highest bidder with ties broken equitably.
Since wn reflects the item’s true worth, we have υn,tn,t−n(ψ, t, w) = wn. If the auction is
first-price, we will have τn,tn,t−n(an,tn, a−n,t−n , ψ, t, w) = ιn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ψ, t, w) · an,tn .
In view of (64), we will further have
rn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ψ, t, w) = (wn − an,tn)× [1(an,tn > maxm6=n am,tm)
+1(an,tn = maxm6=n am,tm) · 1(ψn ≤ ψm − 1 whenever am,tm = an,tn)].
(65)
We will have to replace wn − an,tn with wn − maxm6=n am,tm if the auction is second-price.
Regardless, we can let payoff spaces be Rn,tn = [−w¯, w¯].
Bidders can be alarmists, so that (3) and (43) apply. Or, they can be enterprising with (4)
and (43) being true. In either case, let the utility functions un,tn be identity maps and let
there be a nonempty closed subset Qn,tn of P({1, ..., t¯}
n¯−1 × [0, w¯]n¯), so that the prior set
used in (3) or (4), as a nonempty subset of P(Ωn,tn) ≡ P(Ψn¯×{1, ..., t¯}
n¯−1× [0, w¯]n¯), satisfies
Pn,tn = {υ} ×Qn,tn. (66)
In (66), υ stands for the uniform distribution on Ψn¯ wherein every member ψ receives a
1/n! chance. Every q ∈ P({1, ..., t¯}n¯−1× [0, w¯]n¯) can be understood as being made up of two
components p ≡ (pt−n)t−n∈{1,...,t¯}n¯−1 and ν ≡ (νt−n)t−n∈{1,...,t¯}n¯−1 , where p is a probability mass
function on opponents’ type profiles and given each opponent-type profile t−n ∈ {1, ..., t¯}
n¯−1,
the element νt−n ∈ P([0, w¯]
n¯) is a distribution on the worth profile. The end effect for
q ≡ (p, ν) is such that, for any T ′ ⊆ {1, ..., t¯}n¯−1 and W ′ ∈ B([0, w¯]n¯),
q(T ′ ×W ′) =
∑
t−n∈T ′
pt−n · νt−n(W
′). (67)
When interested in pure action-based equilibria, for instance, consider s˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n) =
san,tn(an,tn , 1a−n), where the latter function is defined at (38). By (40), we will have pure
strategy 1a ∈ 1A ∩ E
a if and only if an,tn ∈ B˜n,tn(a−n) for every n and tn, where
B˜n,tn(a−n) =
{
an,tn ∈ An,tn|s˜n,tn(an,tn, a−n) ≥ s˜n,tn(a
′
n,tn , a−n) ∀a
′
n,tn ∈ An,tn
}
. (68)
Thus, 1a ∈ 1A will be a pure equilibrium if and only if a ≡ (an,tn)n=1,...,n¯,tn=1,...,t¯ ∈ A ≡∏n¯
n=1
∏t¯
t=1An,tn is that for a corresponding agent-based normal-form game where payoffs
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are the s˜n,tn’s. For the first-price and alarmists’ case, by (3), (6) to (9), (38), (43), and (65)
to (67), as well as other model primitives, we can obtain
s˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n) = inf
(p,ν)∈Qn,tn
u˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n, p, ν), (69)
where an,tn ∈ [−w¯, w¯] and a−n ≡ (am,tm)m6=n,tm∈Tm ∈ [−w¯, w¯]
(n¯−1)·t¯; also,
u˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n, p, ν) =
∑
t−n∈{1,...,t¯}n¯−1
pt−n · v˜n,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, νt−n), (70)
with
v˜n,t−n(an,tn, a−n,t−n , νt−n) =
∫ w¯
0
(wn − an,tn) · νt−n(dw)× [1(an,tn > maxm6=n am,tm)
+1(an,tn = maxm6=n am,tm)/#(argmax am,tm)],
(71)
where #(argmax am,tm) counts the number of bidders that tie in the highest bid.
The model will be symmetric when Qn,tn is independent of n, any of Qn,tn ’s member
(p, ν) ≡ ((pt−n)t−n∈{1,...,t¯}n¯−1 , (νt−n)t−n∈{1,...,t¯}n¯−1) satisfies that pt−n and νt−n are both functions
of the empirical type distribution resulting from t−n, and any transformation that turns any
(wn, w−n) into (wn, w
′
−n) with w
′
−n having the same empirical worth distribution as w−n
is measure-preserving for νt−n . Whether pure action-based equilibria exist remains so far
unresolved, although according to earlier discussion, ordinary action-based equilibria are
guaranteed to exist and when bidders are alarmists, so do ordinary distribution-based ones.
7.3 Existing Models
With the exception of requiring more general type spaces, several existing auction models
can also be cast into the framework set up in Section 7.1.
Lo [31] let every bidder be sure about the true worth to himself of the item being auc-
tioned, while making the bidder uncertain as to which distribution of other bidders’ val-
uations to assume out of an own-valuation-independent set. When bidders are alarmists,
equilibrium own-valuation-dependent bidding prices could be found by examining an associ-
ated traditional auction in which every bidder allows opponents the most optimistic outlooks
ever supportable by his given set of other-valuation distributions.
With a zero reservation price, Lo’s [31] model can be understood as having continuous
type spaces Tn = [0, w¯], with each state tn ∈ Tn being the true worth to bidder n of the
item being auctioned. Its focus is on n¯ = 2 but according to the author, can be extended
to the case with a general n¯ number of bidders. The state space Ω can be understood as
Ψn¯ ×
∏
n∈N Tn = Ψn¯ × [0, w¯]
n¯, with Ψn¯ again serving tie-breaking purposes. Consequently,
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each Ωn,tn = Ψn¯ × {tn} ×
∏
m6=n Tm = Ψn¯ × {tn} × [0, w¯]
n¯−1 and each Ωt = Ψn¯ × {t} =
Ψn¯ × {(tn)n=1,...,n¯}. Again, we can let action spaces be An,tn = [0, w¯].
Note that every ω ∈ Ω is made up of two components, a permutation ψ and a worth
profile t ≡ (tn)n=1,...,n¯. For the first-price case, we now have
rn,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ψ, t) = (tn − an,tn)× [1(an,tn > maxm6=n am,tm)
+1(an,tn = maxm6=n am,tm) · 1(ψn ≤ ψm − 1 whenever am,tm = an,tn)].
(72)
Lo [31] let bidders be alarmists that use identity utility functions un,tn in (43). For the prior
set Pn,tn involved in (3), he let there be a nonempty closed subset Qn of P([0, w¯]
n¯−1) that is
independent of tn, so that Pn,tn = {υ} × Qn, where υ is again the uniform distribution on
Ψn¯. In pursuing pure action-based equilibria, Lo [31] used the same criterion (C.4), with
s˜n,tn(an,tn, a−n) = inf
q∈Qn
u˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n, q), (73)
u˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n, q) =
∫
[0,w¯]n¯−1
v˜n,tn,t−n(an,tn, a−n,t−n) · q(dt−n), (74)
v˜n,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n) = (tn − an,tn)× [1(an,tn > maxm6=n am,tm)
+1(an,tn = maxm6=n am,tm)/#(argmax am,tm)].
(75)
The model will be symmetric when Qn is independent of n and for any of Qn’s member q,
it would render a transformation measure-preserving whenever the latter turns any t−n into
any t′−n with the same empirical type distribution. Concerning Bose, Ozdenoren, and Pape’s
[7] study of optimal auctions, their setup regarding bidders can be similarly casted; the only
exception is that (75) needs to adapt with the particular auction design.
The traditional auction can be considered as having the same type, action, and state
spaces, as well as the payoff structure (72). Identity utility functions un,tn and single priors
ρn,tn would together give rise to satisfaction functions through (43) and (45). Moreover,
ρn,tn = υ × qn,tn where υ is the uniform distribution on Ψn¯ and qn,tn ∈ P([0, w¯]
n¯−1). Often,
qn,tn is independent of tn and is of a product form. These reflect that every bidder views
every competitor’s valuation as being independently drawn from a given distribution.
Cases considered in the above would all fit within our framework, except for the fact that
more general type spaces need to be tolerated. So a generalization in this direction poses as
our most immediate task for future considerations.
8 Concluding Remarks
We have allowed ambiguities on external factors to be treated in games involving incomplete
information. As players can be ambiguous about opponents’ types, while all players can
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have type-sensitive ambiguity attitudes and behaviors, our setting has indirectly enabled
ambiguities on opponents’ ambiguity attitudes and behaviors as well. For the two proposed
behavioral-equilibrium concepts, we arrived to various results concerning their existence,
continuity, and mutual relationships. The enterprising game in which players are optimistic
about the resolutions of their ambiguities delivered more concrete results. Not only are
pure equilibria unified in such a game, but also their existence and monotone features are
guaranteed when strategic complementarities are present.
More than providing normative answers to how participants should behave in situations
involving both incomplete information and diverse ambiguity attitudes, some of our results
might lead to explanations for phenomena already observed in real life. For instance, for
auctions of works of art, offshore oilfields, electromagnetic spectra, etc., we speculate that
uncertainties about the worths of items being auctioned and players’ opportunistic atti-
tudes toward the eventual resolutions of ambiguities might give extra impetus to upward
movements of bidding prices. Hence, the winner’s curse could be made even worse.
The model’s confinement to finite type spaces could certainly hamper its applicabilities
in some occasions. To deal with more general type spaces whilst still countenancing general
ambiguity attitudes, it seems that information structures different from the current one
revolving around the Ωn,tn sets are warranted. Issues concerning topologies on preference
spaces, like those covered in Hildenbrand [25] and Klein and Thompson [29], will likely arise.
Appendices
A Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Proposition 1: By Assumptions 1, 2, and 4, we know that rn,tn,t−n is uniformly
continuous. By a well known convergence result (Hildenbrand [25], D.I.(38)), this will lead
to the continuity of each πan,tn,t−n , defined at (6) as a function from An,tn ×∆−n,t−n ×Ωtn,t−n
to P(Rn,tn), in (an,tn , ω) and also δ−n,t−n. Indeed, suppose limk→+∞(a
k
n,tn , ω
k) = (an,tn , ω)
and limk→+∞ δ
k
−n,t−n
= δ−n,t−n . Then, by (6) and rn,tn,t−n ’s continuity in (an,tn , ω) at an
a−n,t−n-independent rate, limk→+∞ π
a
n,tn,t−n
(akn,tn, δ−n,t−n , ω
k) equals
limk→+∞(
∏
m6=n δm,tm) · (rn,tn,t−n(a
k
n,tn , ·, ω
k))−1
= (
∏
m6=n δm,tm) · (rn,tn,t−n(an,tn, ·, ω))
−1,
(A.1)
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which in turn equals πan,tn,t−n(an,tn , δ−n,t−n, ω). Due to Assumption 1, the spaces Am,tm
are all compact and hence separable. Then, limk→+∞ δ
k
−n,t−n = δ−n,t−n would result with
limk→+∞
∏
m6=n δ
k
m,tm =
∏
m6=n δm,tm . So similarly, by (6) and rn,tn,tn ’s continuity in a−n,t−n ,
we will have limk→+∞ π
a
n,tn,t−n(an,tn , δ
k
−n,t−n, ω) equal to
lim
k→+∞
(
∏
m6=n
δkm,tm) · (rn,tn,t−n(an,tn, ·, ω))
−1 = (
∏
m6=n
δm,tm) · (rn,tn,t−n(an,tn , ·, ω))
−1. (A.2)
The following shows that πan,tn,t−n’s continuity in (an,tn, ω) can be at a rate independent of the
δ−n,t−n present, just also because rn,tn,t−n ’s continuity in (an,tn, ω) is independent of a−n,t−n.
Lemma Let X and Y be separable metric spaces, and u and v be measurable functions from
X to Y . Then, any ρ ∈ P(X) satisfies
ψY (ρ · u
−1, ρ · v−1) ≤ sup
x∈X
dY (u(x), v(x)), (A.3)
where the right-hand side is independent of the ρ involved.
Proof: Let ǫ = supx∈X dY (u(x), v(x)). There is nothing to prove if ǫ = 0 because then u = v.
So suppose ǫ > 0. For any Y ′ ∈ B(Y ), we observe that
u−1(Y ′) ⊆ v−1((Y ′)ǫ). (A.4)
Thus,
(ρ · u−1)(Y ′) ≤ (ρ · v−1)((Y ′)ǫ) < (ρ · v−1)((Y ′)ǫ) + ǫ. (A.5)
So by the definition of the Prokhorov metric ψY , we have the desired inequality.
Combine the continuity in (an,tn , ω) at a δ−n,t−n-independent rate and continuity in
δ−n,t−n , and we get π
a
n,tn,t−n ’s continuity in (an,tn, δ−n,t−n , ω). We can similarly tackle π
d
n,tn,t−n’s
continuity in (δn,tn , δ−n,t−n, ω).
Proof of Proposition 3: We prove by contradiction. Suppose such a ≻n,tn-maximal π
does not exist in Π′. Now for any π′ ∈ Π′, define
L(π′) = {π ∈ Π′|π′ ≻n,tn π}. (A.6)
By the earlier hypothesis, every π ∈ Π′ has a corresponding π′ so that π ∈ L(π′). Thus,
Π′ =
⋃
π′∈Π′
L(π′). (A.7)
By (20) and (A.6), each L(π′) is a projection of Gn,tn ≡ (Πn,tn ×Πn,tn) \ ϕn,tn to the second
Πn,tn . Due to Preference Assumption 1, the set Gn,tn is open. So must be every L(π
′).
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Since Π′ is compact, from (A.7) we can infer that Π′ has a finite subcover from among
the L(π′)’s. Pick a subcover with the smallest number of elements say k, involving open sets
say L(π1), ..., L(πk). Suppose k ≥ 2. By ≻n,tn ’s irreflexibility and (A.6), we know
πk /∈ L(πk). (A.8)
It must be the case that πk ∈ L(πl) for some l ≤ k − 1. Consider any π ∈ L(πk). Note that
πl ≻n,tn πk and πk ≻n,tn π by (A.6). By ≻n,tn ’s transitivity, we must then have πl ≻n,tn π;
that is, π ∈ L(πl). But this just means that L(πk) ⊆ L(πl), a contradiction to the minimality
of k. The only choice is k = 1. But this forces π1 ∈ L(π1), an impossibility in view of (A.8).
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose (akn,tn , δ
k
−n) ∈ An,tn×∆−n for k = 1, 2, ... and (an,tn , δ−n) ∈
An,tn ×∆−n are such that limk→+∞ a
k
n,tn = an,tn, limk→+∞ δ
k
−n = δ−n, and a
k
n,tn ∈ Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ
k
−n)
for each k = 1, 2, .... We are to show that an,tn ∈ Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n) as well.
Let a′n,tn be arbitrarily chosen from An,tn . By the membership of the a
k
n,tn’s in the
corresponding spaces Aˆan,tn(δ
k
−n) and (14),
πan,tn(a
′
n,tn , δ
k
−n) 6≻n,tn π
a
n,tn(a
k
n,tn, δ
k
−n), ∀k = 1, 2, .... (A.9)
Proposition 2 and the first two conditions above will together lead to
lim
k→+∞
πan,tn(a
′
n,tn , δ
k
−n) = π
a
n,tn(a
′
n,tn , δ−n), (A.10)
πan,tn(an,tn, δ−n) = limk→+∞
πan,tn(an,tn , δ
k
−n) = lim
k→+∞
πan,tn(a
k
n,tn , δ
k
−n). (A.11)
Combining (A.9) to (A.11), as well as Preference Assumption 1, we get
πan,tn(a
′
n,tn , δ−n) 6≻n,tn π
a
n,tn(an,tn , δ−n). (A.12)
Due to (14) again and the arbitrariness of a′n,tn ∈ An,tn , it follows that an,tn ∈ Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n).
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose δk ≡ (δkm)m∈N ≡ (δ
k
m,τm)m∈N,τm∈Tm ∈ ∆ ≡
∏
m∈N ∆m ≡∏
m∈N
∏
τm∈Tm
∆m,τm for k = 1, 2, ... and δ ≡ (δm)m∈N ≡ (δm,τm)m∈N,τm∈Tm ∈ ∆ are such
that limk→+∞ δ
k
n,tn = δn,tn , limk→+∞ δ
k
−n = δ−n, and δ
k
n,tn ∈ Bˆ
a
n,tn(δ
k
−n) for each k = 1, 2, ....
We are to show that δn,tn ∈ Bˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n) as well. For this purpose, the closedness of Aˆ
a
n,tn(·)
as shown in Proposition 4 and the convergence of δk−n to δ−n will now lead to
Ls
(
(Aˆan,tn(δ
k
−n))k=1,2,...
)
⊆ Aˆan,tn(δ−n), (A.13)
37
where Ls(·) stands for a set sequence’s topological limes superior; see Hildenbrand [25] (Sec-
tion B.II). Let ǫ > 0 be given. Since δkn,tn converges to δn,tn , as long as l is large enough,
δln,tn
[(
Ls((Aˆan,tn(δ
k
−n))k=1,2,...)
)ǫ]
≤ δn,tn
[(
Ls((Aˆan,tn(δ
k
−n))k=1,2,...)
)2ǫ]
+ ǫ. (A.14)
By the definition of Ls(·) and An,tn ’s compactness, we have, when l is further large enough,
Aˆan,tn(δ
l
−n) ⊆
(
Ls
(
(Aˆan,tn(δ
k
−n))k=1,2,...
))ǫ
. (A.15)
Combining the above, we obtain
δn,tn
[
(Aˆan,tn(δ−n))
2ǫ
]
≥ δn,tn
[(
Ls((Aˆan,tn(δ
k
−n))k=1,2,...)
)2ǫ]
≥ δln,tn
[(
Ls((Aˆan,tn(δ
k
−n))k=1,2,...)
)ǫ]
− ǫ ≥ δln,tn
[
Aˆan,tn(δ
l
−n)
]
− ǫ = 1− ǫ,
(A.16)
where the first inequality is due to (A.13), the second inequality is due to (A.14), the third
inequality is due to (A.15), and the last equality comes from (15) and the membership of
δln,tn in Bˆ
a
n,tn(δ
l
−n). For any k = 1, 2, ..., this means that
δn,tn
[
+∞⋂
l=k
(
Aˆan,tn(δ−n)
)1/l]
≥ 1−
1
2k
. (A.17)
According to Proposition 4, Aˆan,tn(δ−n) is closed and hence is equal to
⋂+∞
l=k (Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n))
1/l for
any k = 1, 2, .... So the above (A.17) will result with δn,tn(Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n)) = 1, translating into
δn,tn ’s membership in Bˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n) by (15).
We can follow almost the same steps used in the proof of Proposition 4 to deduce that
as a correspondence from ∆−n to ∆n,tn , each Bˆ
d
n,tn is closed.
Proof of Proposition 7: Let ϕkn,tn be members of Φn,tn for k = 1, 2, ... and let F be a
member of Fn,tn. Suppose limk→+∞ dFn,tn (ϕ
k
n,tn, F ) = 0. We show that F ∈ Φn,tn as well.
According to Theorem B.II.1 of Hildenbrand [25],
Li
(
(ϕkn,tn)k=1,2,...
)
= F = Ls
(
(ϕkn,tn)k=1,2,...
)
. (A.18)
In the above, Li((ϕkn,tn)k=1,2,...) is the topological limes inferior of the sequence (ϕ
k
n,tn)k=1,2,...:
any (π, π′) ∈ Πn,tn×Πn,tn will belong to the set if and only if there is a sequence ((πk, π
′
k))k=1,2,...
so that (πk, π
′
k) ∈ ϕ
k
n,tn and limk→+∞ dΠn,tn×Πn,tn ((πk, π
′
k), (π, π
′)) = 0; also, Ls((ϕkn,tn)k=1,2,...)
is the topological limes superior of the sequence (ϕkn,tn)k=1,2,...: any (π, π
′) ∈ Πn,tn×Πn,tn will
belong to the set if and only if there is a subsequence ((πqk , π
′
qk))k=1,2,... so that (πqk , π
′
qk) ∈
ϕq
k
n,tn and limk→+∞ dΠn,tn×Πn,tn ((πqk , π
′
qk), (π, π
′)) = 0.
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We first show that F satisfies (i). For any π ∈ Πn,tn, we know from the membership of
each ϕkn,tn in Φn,tn that (π, π) ∈ ϕ
k
n,tn. Then, it must be true that (π, π) ∈ Li((ϕ
k
n,tn)k=1,2,...).
But by (A.18), this means that (π, π) ∈ F .
We next show that F satisfies (ii). Suppose members π, π′, and π′′ of Πn,tn are such that
(π, π′) /∈ F and (π′, π′′) /∈ F . Since F is closed, there must exist ǫ > 0, so that for any π1
in the closed ǫ-neighborhood of π, any π′1 in the closed ǫ-neighborhood of π
′, and any π′′1 in
the closed ǫ-neighborhood of π′′, neither (π1, π
′
1) nor (π
′
1, π
′′
1 ) is in F .
If ϕkn,tn ∩ ({(π, π
′)})ǫ 6= ∅ occurred for an infinite number of k’s, then due to the com-
pactness of Πn,tn × Πn,tn, we would have
Ls
(
(ϕkn,tn)k=1,2,...
)
∩ ({(π, π′)})
ǫ
6= ∅. (A.19)
But by (A.18), this would lead to F ∩ ({(π, π′)})ǫ 6= ∅, a contradiction. So there must exist
k′, so that ϕkn,tn ∩ ({(π, π
′)})ǫ = ∅ for k = k′, k′+1, .... Similarly, there must exist k′′, so that
ϕkn,tn ∩ ({(π
′, π′′)})ǫ = ∅ for k = k′′, k′′ + 1, .... Then, for k = k′ ∨ k′′, k′ ∨ k′′ + 1, ..., the set
ϕkn,tn will intersect neither ({π, π
′})ǫ nor ({π′, π′′)})ǫ.
That is, for any π1 in the closed ǫ-neighborhood of π, π
′
1 in the closed ǫ-neighborhood of
π′, and π′′1 in the closed ǫ-neighborhood of π
′′, we have (π1, π
′
1) /∈ ϕ
k
n,tn and (π
′
1, π
′′
1) /∈ ϕ
k
n,tn
for any k = k′ ∨ k′′, k′ ∨ k′′ + 1, .... But since each such ϕkn,tn is a member of Φn,tn and hence
satisfies (ii), ϕkn,tn must not contain (π1, π
′′
1) either. Therefore,
ϕkn,tn ∩ ({(π, π
′′)})ǫ = ∅, ∀k = k′ ∨ k′′, k′ ∨ k′′ + 1, .... (A.20)
This will lead to (π, π′′) /∈ Ls((ϕkn,tn)k=1,2,...) which, in view of (A.18), amounts to (π, π
′′) /∈ F .
Due to the satisfaction of both (i) and (ii), we know that F ∈ Φn,tn as well.
Proof of Proposition 8: Suppose sequence (δk−n)k=1,2,... in ∆−n converges to its member
δ−n, and sequence (ϕ
k
n,tn)k=1,2,... in Φn,tn converges to its member ϕn,tn so that
Ls
(
(ϕkn,tn)k=1,2,...
)
⊆ ϕn,tn. (A.21)
Also, suppose sequence (akn,tn)k=1,2,... in An,tn converges to its member an,tn ; in addition, a
k
n,tn
is inside Aˆan,tn(δ
k
−n|ϕ
k
n,tn) for every k = 1, 2, ....
Then, by Proposition 2, the sequence (πan,tn(a
k
n,tn , δ
k
−n))k=1,2,... in Πn,tn would converge to
its member πan,tn(an,tn , δ−n). Fix any member π of Π˜
a
n,tn(δ−n). By the same continuity result
and (22), we also know there is a sequence (πk)k=1,2,... in Πn,tn that converges to π and for
each k = 1, 2, ..., the payoff-distribution vector πk is inside Π˜an,tn(δ
k
−n).
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For any k = 1, 2, ..., since akn,tn ∈ Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ
k
−n|ϕ
k
n,tn) and π
k ∈ Π˜an,tn(δ
k
−n), we have from (33)
that (πk, πan,tn(a
k
n,tn , δ
k
−n)) ∈ ϕ
k
n,tn . Now the convergence of (π
k)k=1,2,... to π and that of
(πan,tn(a
k
n,tn , δ
k
−n))k=1,2,... to π
a
n,tn(an,tn , δ−n) would lead to(
π, πan,tn(an,tn , δ−n)
)
∈ Li
(
(ϕkn,tn)k=1,2,...
)
⊆ Ls
(
(ϕkn,tn)k=1,2,...
)
. (A.22)
By (A.21), we will then have (π, πan,tn(an,tn , δ−n)) ∈ ϕn,tn . Going over all such π’s, we obtain
Π˜an,tn(δ−n)× {π
a
n,tn(an,tn, δ−n)} ⊆ ϕn,tn. (A.23)
By (33), this will just mean that an,tn ∈ Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn).
Proof of Proposition 9: Suppose sequence (δk−n)k=1,2,... in ∆−n converges to its member
δ−n and sequence (ϕ
k
n,tn)k=1,2,... in Φn,tn converges to its member ϕn,tn. Also, suppose sequence
(δkn,tn)k=1,2,... in ∆n,tn converges to its member δn,tn ; in addition, δ
k
n,tn is inside Bˆ
a
n,tn(δ
k
−n|ϕ
k
n,tn)
for every k = 1, 2, ....
Then, the upper hemi-continuity of Aˆan,tn(·|·) as shown in Proposition 8, the convergence
of δk−n to δ−n, and the convergence of ϕ
k
n,tn to ϕn,tn, will together lead to
Ls
(
(Aˆan,tn(δ
k
−n|ϕ
k
n,tn))k=1,2,...
)
⊆ Aˆan,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn), (A.24)
which is just like (A.13) in the proof of Proposition 5, except with δk−n|ϕ
k
n,tn replacing δ
k
−n.
The rest of the proof can just follow the earlier proof with the same replacement. In the
end, we can show that δn,tn(Aˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn)) = 1, translating into δn,tn’s membership in
Bˆan,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) by (34).
We can use similar arguments in the proof of Proposition 8, involving Proposition 2, to
show that Bˆdn,tn(·|·) defined in (36) is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof of Theorem2: Suppose sequence (ϕk)k=1,2,... in Φ converges to its member ϕ, se-
quence (δk)k=1,2,... in ∆ converges to its member δ, and for each k = 1, 2, ..., δ
k is a member
of Ea(ϕk). By (35), we would have δkn,tn ∈ Bˆn,tn(δ
k
−n|ϕ
k
n,tn) for each n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn.
Fix some n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn. By the convergence of the sequence δ
k
n,tn to δn,tn and each
δkn,tn ’s membership in Bˆn,tn(δ
k
−n|ϕ
k
n,tn), we would have
δn,tn ∈ Li
(
(Bn,tn(δ
k
−n|ϕ
k
n,tn))k=1,2,...
)
⊆ Ls
(
(Bn,tn(δ
k
−n|ϕ
k
n,tn))k=1,2,...
)
. (A.25)
By Proposition 9 on the upper hemi-continuity of Bˆan,tn(·|·), the convergence of δ
k
−n to δ−n,
and the convergence of ϕkn,tn to ϕn,tn , we can conclude that
Ls
(
(Bn,tn(δ
k
−n|ϕ
k
n,tn))k=1,2,...
)
⊆ Bˆan,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn). (A.26)
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Combining (A.25) and (A.26), we can get δn,tn ∈ Bˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn). Note that this is true for
every n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn. So by (35), we have δ ∈ E
a(ϕ).
We can use similar arguments, involving Proposition 9, to show that Ed defined in (37)
is upper hemi-continuous.
B Proofs for Section 6
Proof of Lemma 1: We first prove that ι(y) ∈ P(Z) at every y ∈ Y . Just because
κ(x, y) ∈ P(Z) at every x ∈ X , we can easily see from (53) that [ι(y)](∅) = 0 and [ι(y)](Z ′)+
[ι(y)](Z \ Z ′) = 1 at every Z ′ ∈ B(Z). Given non-overlapping subsets Z1, Z2, ... in B(Z),
bounded convergence applied to (53) will also lead to
[ι(y)]
(
+∞⋃
k=1
Zk
)
=
+∞∑
k=1
[ι(y)](Zk). (B.1)
Thus, ι(y) is a probability measure on the measurable space (Z,B(Z)).
We next show that ι is continuous from Y to P(Z). For sequence y1, y2, ... that converges
to y in Y , we know from (b) that limk→+∞ κ(x, y
k) = κ(x, y) at every x ∈ X . By the nature
of the Prokhorov metric, this amounts to that, for every open subset Z ′ of Z,
[κ(x, y)](Z ′) ≤ lim inf
k→+∞
[κ(x, yk)](Z ′). (B.2)
Now we can obtain
[ι(y)](Z ′) =
∫
X
[κ(x, y)](Z ′) · δ(dx) ≤
∫
X
{lim infk→+∞[κ(x, y
k)](Z ′)} · δ(dx)
≤ lim infk→+∞
∫
X
[κ(x, yk)](Z ′) · δ(dx) = lim infk→+∞[ι(y
k)](Z ′),
(B.3)
where the first equality is due to (53), the first inequality uses (B.2), the second inequality
comes from Fatou’s lemma, and the last equality is again due to (53). Since (B.3) applies to
every open subset Z ′ of Z, it amounts to limk→+∞ ι(y
k) = ι(y). Hence, ι ∈ C(Y,P(Z)).
Proof of Proposition 10: We show that πan,tn(δ−n) satisfies both (a) and (b) with X =
An,tn , Y = Ωn,tn ≡
⋃
t−n∈T−n
Ωtn,t−n , and Z = Rn,tn .
By Assumption 4, the payoff function rn,tn,t−n(·, ·, ω) at every ω ∈ Ωtn,t−n is continu-
ous and hence measurable. So for any R′n,tn ∈ B(Rn,tn), the set (rn,tn,t−n(·, ·, ω))
−1(R′n,tn)
is a member of B(An,tn × A−n,t−n). Meanwhile, we can obtain from (6) and (7) that
[πan,tn,t−n(an,tn, δ−n,t−n , ω)](R
′
n,tn) is the integration of the indicator function of the measurable
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set (rn,tn,t−n(·, ·, ω))
−1(R′n,tn) over a−n,t−n ∈ A−n,t−n under the measure
∏
m6=n δm,tm . So by
Fubini’s theorem, [πan,tn,t−n(·, δ−n,t−n, ω)](R
′
n,tn) is a Borel-measurable mapping from An,tn to
[0, 1]. This means that (a) is satisfied by the vector πan,tn(δ−n). Also, Proposition 1 provides
the continuity of πan,tn,t−n(·, δ−n,t−n, ·) as a mapping from An,tn ×Ωtn,t−n to P(Rn,tn) at every
t−n ∈ T−n. In view of the separation condition (19), we can obtain (b) as well.
Proof of Proposition 11: It will suffice to prove Bˆdn,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) ⊆ Bˆ
a
n,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) for
every (n, tn)-pair and δ−n. But by (57) and (58), the conclusion is immediate in view of the
relation Wdn,tn(ϕn,tn) ⊆ W
a
n,tn(ϕn,tn).
Proof of Proposition 12: It will suffice to prove Bˆan,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) ⊆ Bˆ
d
n,tn(δ−n|ϕn,tn) for
every (n, tn)-pair and δ−n. But by (57) and (58), the conclusion is immediate in view of the
relation Wan,tn(ϕn,tn) ⊆ W
d
n,tn(ϕn,tn).
Proof of Proposition 13: Suppose for continuous kernel κn,tn ∈ K(An,tn ,Ωn,tn , Rn,tn) and
action distribution δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn , the value sn,tn(κn,tn(an,tn)) is strictly below sn,tn(κn,tn(a
′
n,tn))
for some a′n,tn ∈ An,tn at a δn,tn-positive set of an,tn ’s. Let
sn,tn = sup
an,tn∈An,tn
sn,tn(κn,tn(an,tn)), (B.4)
which is finite as sn,tn is a continuous map on the compact space Πn,tn . Our hypothesis
indicates that δn,tn(A
′
n,tn) > 0 for A
′
n,tn = {an,tn ∈ An,tn |sn,tn(κn,tn(an,tn)) < sn,tn}. Note that
A′n,tn =
⋃+∞
l=1 A
l
n,tn , where
Aln,tn =
{
an,tn ∈ An,tn |sn,tn(κn,tn(an,tn)) < sn,tn −
1
l
}
, ∀l = 1, 2, .... (B.5)
So for some l, we have δn,tn(A
l
n,tn) > 1/l > 0. Identify for this l an a
l
n,tn ∈ An,tn so that
sn,tn(κn,tn(a
l
n,tn)) ≥ sn,tn −
1
2l2
≥ sn,tn −
1
2l
. (B.6)
Now let δ′n,tn ∈ P(An,tn) be the Dirac measure on the point a
l
n,tn. By this construction,
sn,tn
(∫
An,tn
κn,tn(a
′
n,tn) · δ
′
n,tn(da
′
n,tn)
)
= sn,tn(κn,tn(a
l
n,tn))
≥
∫
An,tn
sn,tn(κn,tn(an,tn)) · δn,tn(dan,tn) + δn,tn(a
l
n,tn)/(2l)− 1/(2l
2) · (1− 1/l)
>
∫
An,tn
sn,tn(κn,tn(an,tn)) · δn,tn(dan,tn),
(B.7)
which, by sn,tn’s strong convexity with respect to An,tn, is greater than
sn,tn
(∫
An,tn
κn,tn(an,tn) · δn,tn(dan,tn)
)
. (B.8)
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Therefore, the sn,tn-based ϕn,tn is individually prominent with respect to An,tn .
Proof of Proposition 14: Since sn,tn ’s strong linearity implies its strong convexity, we
know that ϕn,tn is individually prominent by Proposition 13.
For mixture preservation, suppose given continuous kernel κn,tn ∈ K(An,tn ,Ωn,tn , Rn,tn)
and action distribution δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn , the value sn,tn(κn,tn(an,tn)) is above sn,tn(κn,tn(a
′
n,tn))
for every a′n,tn ∈ An,tn at δn,tn-almost every an,tn . Then by the strong linearity of sn,tn,
sn,tn
(∫
An,tn
κn,tn(a
′
n,tn) · δ
′
n,tn(da
′
n,tn)
)
=
∫
An,tn
sn,tn(κn,tn(a
′
n,tn)) · δ
′
n,tn(da
′
n,tn)
≤
∫
An,tn
sn,tn(κn,tn(an,tn)) · δn,tn(dan,tn) = sn,tn
(∫
An,tn
κn,tn(an,tn) · δn,tn(dan,tn)
)
,
(B.9)
for any δ′n,tn ∈ ∆n,tn . Thus, the sn,tn-based ϕn,tn is mixture-preserving with respect to An,tn.
Proof of Proposition 15: Under Assumption 2, the state space Ωn,tn is compact and
hence separable. Since Rn,tn is finite, P(Rn,tn) is homeomorphic to a compact subset of a
finite-dimensional Euclidean space. Therefore, Πn,tn ≡ C(Ωn,tn ,P(Rn,tn)) equipped with the
uniform metric based on the Prokhorov metric for Rn,tn is homeomorphic to a subset of the
infinite-dimensional Euclidean space ℜ∞. The latter, being equipped with the metric induced
from the l∞-norm, is a real topological vector space. Now, since κn,tn ∈ K(An,tn ,Ωn,tn , Rn,tn)
is continuous from An,tn to Πn,tn, it can be treated as a continuous and hence measurable
mapping from An,tn to ℜ
∞. That is, κn,tn is equivalent to a random variable say Kn,tn with
domain in the probability space (An,tn ,B(An,tn), δn,tn) and range in the measurable space
(ℜ∞,B(ℜ∞)). Incidentally, (59) can be written as
sn,tn(E[Kn,tn ]) ≥ E[sn,tn(Kn,tn)]. (B.10)
Then, using the general Jensen’s inequality, we can deduce that ordinary concavity/convexity
will lead to the so-called strong concavity/convexity.
Proof of Theorem 4: Let continuous kernel κn,tn ∈ K(An,tn ,Ωn,tn , Rn,tn) be given. By (43)
and (45), we know with a utility function un,tn ∈ C(Rn,tn ,ℜ) and a single prior ρn,tn ∈
P(Rn,tn), the traditional game’s satisfaction function sn,tn will produce, at each an,tn ∈ An,tn ,
sn,tn(κn,tn(an,tn)) =
∫
Ωn,tn
{
∫
Rn,tn
un,tn(r) · [κn,tn(an,tn , ω)](dr)} · ρn,tn(dω). (B.11)
The above is Borel-measurable in an,tn because un,tn is the limit of a sequence of simple
real-valued functions on Rn,tn . For any distribution δn,tn ∈ ∆n,tn, by understanding un,tn as
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a sequence of simple real-valued functions on Rn,tn, we can obtain∫
An,tn
sn,tn(κn,tn(an,tn)) · δn,tn(dan,tn)
=
∫
An,tn
∫
Ωn,tn
{
∫
Rn,tn
un,tn(r) · [κn,tn(an,tn, ω)](dr)} · ρn,tn(dω) · δn,tn(dan,tn)
=
∫
Rn,tn
un,tn(r) · [
∫
An,tn
∫
Ωn,tn
κn,tn(an,tn , ω) · ρn,tn(dω) · δn,tn(dan,tn)](dr)
=
∫
Ωn,tn
{
∫
Rn,tn
un,tn(r) · [
∫
An,tn
κn,tn(an,tn, ω) · δn,tn(dan,tn)](dr)} · ρn,tn(dω)
= sn,tn
(∫
An,tn
κn,tn(an,tn) · δn,tn(dan,tn)
)
.
(B.12)
So the satisfaction functions sn,tn for the traditional game are strongly linear with respect to
their corresponding An,tn ’s. Due to Propositions 13 and 14, each ϕn,tn induced by sn,tn will
be both individually prominent and mixture-preserving with respect to An,tn. By Proposi-
tions 11 and 12, we then have Ed = Ea. Meanwhile, the existence of both types of equilibria
can come from Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 5: Let us use 1a−n for (1am,tm )m6=n,tm∈Tm. Suppose 1a ∈ E
d for some
a ≡ (an,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn in the product action space
∏
n∈N
∏
tn∈Tn
An,tn . Then, by (17) and (18),
πdn,tn(δ
′
n,tn , 1a−n) 6≻n,tn π
d
n,tn(1an,tn , 1a−n), ∀n ∈ N, tn ∈ Tn, δ
′
n,tn ∈ ∆n,tn . (B.13)
Since any 1An,tn is merely a subset of its corresponding ∆n,tn , this results in
πdn,tn(1a′n,tn , 1a−n) 6≻n,tn π
d
n,tn(1an,tn , 1a−n), ∀n ∈ N, tn ∈ Tn, a
′
n,tn ∈ An,tn . (B.14)
Due to (61), this is the same as
πan,tn(a
′
n,tn, 1a−n) 6≻n,tn π
a
n,tn(an,tn , 1a−n), ∀n ∈ N, tn ∈ Tn, a
′
n,tn ∈ An,tn . (B.15)
But (14) to (16) will give this the meaning of 1a ∈ E
a.
Proof of Proposition 16: Due to (4) and (39),
sdn,tn(δn,tn , δ−n) = sup
ρ∈Pn,tn
s0n,tn
(
πdn,tn(δn,tn, δ−n), ρ
)
, (B.16)
where s0n,tn is defined at (43). We have from (50) and (52) that
s0n,tn
(
πdn,tn(δn,tn, δ−n), ρ
)
=
∫
An,tn
s0n,tn
(
πan,tn(an,tn , δ−n), ρ
)
· δn,tn(dan,tn). (B.17)
This means that s0n,tn(π
d
n,tn(·, δ−n), ρ) is linear. With (B.16) showing it to be the supremum
of linear functions, we can thus conclude that sdn,tn(·, δ−n) is convex.
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From (B.17), it is also clear that
s0n,tn
(
πdn,tn(1an,tn , δ−n), ρ
)
= s0n,tn
(
πan,tn(an,tn , δ−n), ρ
)
. (B.18)
Hence, (4), (38), and (39) will together lead to the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 2: The compactness of X will lead to that of P(X). Because f is
continuous, some ξ0 ∈ P(X) will have achieved the supremum. The measure’s support
supp(ξ0) is a closed subset of X . We are done if it is already a singleton. Suppose otherwise.
Since X is compact in a finite-dimensional real Euclidean space say ℜk, it is bounded. Some
closed rectangle Y 0 with a finite total edge length say e0 ≡ e01 + · · · + e
0
k > 0 must have
covered supp(ξ0). Without loss of generality, suppose e01 is the largest among all of Y
0’s edge
lengths. Note that e01 ≥ e
0/k.
Consider the closed rectangle Y 0L which takes the left half of Y
0’s first edge and the rest
of its edges. Note that the closure of Y 0 \ Y 0L is Y
0
R, the closed rectangle which takes the
right half of Y 0’s first edge and the rest of its edges. For either the left- or right-half closed
rectangle, the total edge length e1 is at most (2k−1)/(2k) times e0. Suppose ξ0(X∩Y 0L ) = 0.
Then, supp(ξ0) is indeed covered by the smaller rectangle Y 0R. Suppose ξ
0(X∩(Y 0\Y 0L )) = 0.
Then, supp(ξ0) is indeed covered by the smaller rectangle Y 0L .
If neither is true, then we have both p0L ≡ ξ
0(X ∩ Y 0L ) > 0 and p
0
R ≡ ξ
0(X ∩ (Y 0 \ Y 0L )) =
1− p0L > 0. Consider members of P(X),
ξ0L ≡
1
p0L
· ξ0|X∩Y 0
L
, and ξ0R ≡
1
p0R
· ξ0|X∩(Y 0\Y 0
L
). (B.19)
Note that supp(ξ0L) ⊆ Y
0
L and supp(ξ
0
R) ⊆ Y
0
R. Also,
ξ0 = p0L · ξ
0
L + p
0
R · ξ
0
R. (B.20)
By the convexity of f ,
p0L · f(ξ
0
L) + p
0
R · f(ξ
0
R) ≥ f(ξ
0). (B.21)
Since ξ0 has already achieved the supremum, both ξ0L and ξ
0
R must have too.
So no matter whichever one of the above three cases is present, we will be able to identify
some supremum-reaching ξ1 ∈ P(X), whose support supp(ξ1) is covered by a closed rectangle
Y 1, inside the original support-covering rectangle Y 0 and with a total edge length e1 that is
at most (2k − 1)/(2k) times the original e0.
We can repeat the whole procedure from ξ0 to ξ1 incessantly. Then, we will get a sequence
(ξn)n=0,1,... of supremum-reaching distributions in P(X), whose supports are covered by
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increasingly nested closed rectangles Y n with total edge lengths satisfying
en+1 ≤
2k − 1
2k
· en, ∀n = 0, 1, .... (B.22)
Thus, limn→+∞ e
n = 0, and hence (X ∩ Y n)n=0,1,... is a nested sequence of nonempty closed
sets with shrinking dimensions in the compact set X . There must be one and only one
member say x ∈ X inside all of the rectangles Y n.
For any given ǫ > 0, we know en will be smaller than it when n is large enough. For any
closed subset F of ℜk, let F ǫ be the set of all points that are within ǫ-distance of F , where
the distance between two points in ℜk is measured through the l1-norm. Because x is inside
Y n, whose total edge length en is below ǫ, we can conclude that
x /∈ X ∩ F ǫ =⇒ X ∩ F ∩ Y n = ∅, (B.23)
which will further lead to (X ∩ F ) ∩ supp(ξn) = ∅ because supp(ξn) is in Y n. So depending
on whether or not x ∈ X ∩ F ǫ, we have either
1x(X ∩ F
ǫ) + ǫ = 1 + ǫ > 1 ≥ ξn(X ∩ F ), (B.24)
or
1x(X ∩ F
ǫ) + ǫ = ǫ > 0 = ξn(X ∩ F ). (B.25)
But (B.24) and (B.25) together mean that
ψX(1x, ξ
n) ≤ ǫ. (B.26)
That is, when measured by the Prokhorov metric ψX adopted to the distribution space
P(X), the sequence (ξn)n=0,1,... converges to 1x. By f ’s continuity,
f(ξ0) = f(ξ1) = · · · = f(1x), (B.27)
and hence the Dirac measure 1x has achieved the supremum.
Proof of Theorem 6: Combining Proposition 16 and (62), we obtain
sup
a′n,tn∈An,tn
san,tn(a
′
n,tn , δ−n) = sup
δ′n,tn∈1An,tn
sdn,tn(δ
′
n,tn , δ−n) = sup
δ′n,tn∈∆n,tn
sdn,tn(δ
′
n,tn , δ−n). (B.28)
Now suppose 1a ∈ E
a for some a ≡ (an,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn in the space
∏
n∈N
∏
tn∈Tn
An,tn . Then,
due to (40),
san,tn(an,tn , 1a−n) = sup
a′n,tn∈An,tn
san,tn(a
′
n,tn, 1a−n), ∀n ∈ N, tn ∈ Tn. (B.29)
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By (B.28), this will lead to
san,tn(an,tn, 1a−n) = sup
δ′n,tn∈∆n,tn
sdn,tn(δ
′
n,tn , 1a−n), ∀n ∈ N, tn ∈ Tn. (B.30)
But due to Proposition 16, we have further that
sdn,tn(1an,tn , 1a−n) = sup
δ′n,tn∈∆n,tn
sdn,tn(δ
′
n,tn, 1a−n), ∀n ∈ N, tn ∈ Tn. (B.31)
According to (41), this exactly means that 1a ∈ E
d. The above results with 1A∩E
a ⊆ 1A∩E
d.
We can reach our desired conclusion by combining this with Theorem 5.
C A Special Enterprising Game
C.1 No Ambiguity on Opponent-type Distributions
Due to Theorem 6’s unification of its two types of pure equilibria, we only have to deal with
pure action-based equilibria for the enterprising game. Define
s˜n,tn(an,tn, a−n) = s
a
n,tn(an,tn, 1a−n), (C.1)
where san,tn is given by (38) and a−n ∈ A−n ≡
∏
m6=nAm ≡
∏
m6=n
∏
tm∈Tm
Am,tm represents
opponents’ pure-action profile. Due to (4), (6) to (9), (38), (43), and (C.1),
s˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n) = sup
ρ∈Pn,tn
wn,tn(an,tn, a−n, ρ), (C.2)
where
wn,tn(an,tn , a−n, ρ) =
∑
t−n∈T−n
∫
Ωtn,t−n
u˜n,tn,t−n(an,tn , a−n,t−n, ω) · ρ|Ωtn,t−n (dω), (C.3)
and u˜n,tn,t−n ≡ un,tn ◦ rn,tn,t−n is the continuous real-valued composite payoff-utility function
defined on the compact At × Ωt ≡ An,tn × A−n,t−n × Ωtn,t−n .
By (40), we will have pure strategy 1a ∈ 1A ∩ E
a if and only if an,tn ∈ B˜n,tn(a−n), where
B˜n,tn(a−n) =
{
an,tn ∈ An,tn |s˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n) ≥ s˜n,tn(a
′
n,tn , a−n) ∀a
′
n,tn ∈ An,tn
}
. (C.4)
Thus, 1a ∈ 1A will be a pure equilibrium for Γ if and only if a ∈ A is that for a corresponding
agent-based normal-form game where payoffs are the s˜n,tn ’s given at (C.2) and (C.3).
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We find a special case to be further analyzable. In this case,
(a) all the action spaces An,tn ’s across different tn’s are the same;
(b) there is a compact metric space Ω˜, so that every Ωt is merely {t} × Ω˜;
(c) for each player n ∈ N and type tn ∈ Tn, there are distribution pn,tn ≡ (pn,tn|t−n)t−n∈T−n
and nonempty subset Qn,tn of (P(Ω˜))
T−n , so that the prior set used in the definition (4), as
a nonempty subset of P(Ωn,tn) ≡ P(T−n × Ω˜), satisfies
Pn,tn =
{
pn,tn|t−n × νt−n |ν ≡ (νt−n)t−n∈T−n ∈ Qn,tn
}
. (C.5)
In most works on games involving incomplete information, (a) was assumed. Due to this
point, we can just use An for the action space of player n regardless of his type and now
use A−n for
∏
m6=nAm. By (b), every Ωn,tn = T−n × Ω˜ and Ω = T × Ω˜, indicating that clear
cuts can be made between players’ types and other external factors which affect all players.
For convenience, we still call each ω˜ a state. The domain of every payoff-utility function
u˜n,tn,t−n is An × A−n × Ωtn,t−n . Because different Ωtn,t−n ’s are disjoint, we can patch up all
the u˜n,tn,t−n to obtain u˜n : An × A−n × Ω → ℜ. But with (b), ω = (tn, t−n, ω˜). So the
just gotten u˜n(an, a−n, ω) can be further rewritten as u˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ω˜). This function is
still continuous on a compact space. Meanwhile, (c) means the following. With probability
pn,tn|t−n player n believes unambiguously that opponents’ type profile is at some t−n; his
ambiguity on other external factors, on the other hand, is reflected by the membership of
the prior vector ν ≡ (νt−n)t−n∈T−n in the set Qn,tn .
With (C.5) in place, (C.2) and (C.3) can be rewritten as
s˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n) = sup
ν∈Qn,tn
w˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n, ν), (C.6)
where an,tn ∈ An and a−n ≡ (am,tm)m6=n,tm∈Tm ∈
∏
m6=nA
Tm
m ; also,
w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν) =
∑
t−n∈T−n
pn,tn|t−n · v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n,t−n , νt−n), (C.7)
where an ∈ An and
v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, µ) =
∫
Ω˜
u˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ω˜) · µ(dω˜), (C.8)
where this time a−n ∈ A−n and µ ∈ P(Ω˜).
Later, it might help to understand the Qn,tn used in (C.5) as follows:
Qn,tn =

 ∏
t−n∈T−n
P˜n,tn,t−n

⋂Kn,tn, (C.9)
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where P˜n,tn,t−n ⊆ P(Ω˜) for each t−n ∈ T−n and Kn,tn ⊆ (P(Ω˜))
T−n. For instance, we can
always let P˜n,tn,t−n = P(Ω˜) and Kn,tn = Qn,tn . Our special enterprising game is denotable by
Γ ≡ (N, (Tn)n∈N , (An)n∈N , Ω˜, (u˜n,t)n∈N,t∈T , (pn,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn , (P˜n,t)n∈N,t∈T , (Kn,tn)n∈N,tn∈Tn). In
it, there is no ambiguity on the opponent-type distribution. Rather, each (n, tn)-player is
uncertain about distributions of the non-type factors.
C.2 Enter Strategic Complementarities
Let each action space An be a finite set or compact interval within the real line ℜ, and equip it
with the ordinary order. For each A−n, we adopt the component-wise partial order. For two
partially ordered sets X and Y , we use M(X, Y ) to denote the subset of Y X that contains
all monotone mappings from X to Y , i.e., mappings y : X → Y so that y(x1) ≤ y(x2)
whenever x1, x2 ∈ X satisfy x1 ≤ x2. We let the component-wise partial order be adopted
for
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) as well.
We further suppose that the state space Ω˜ =
∏k¯
k=1 Ω˜k where k¯ is a natural number
and each Ω˜k is a finite set or compact interval within the real line ℜ. Also, we equip Ω˜
with the component-wise partial order. For the state-distribution space P(Ω˜), we adopt the
usual stochastic order, so that µ1, µ2 ∈ P(Ω˜) is considered to satisfy µ1 ≤ µ2 when for any
monotone function q ∈M(Ω˜,ℜ) that is integrable under both µ1 and µ2,∫
Ω˜
q(ω˜) · µ1(dω˜) ≤
∫
Ω˜
q(ω˜) · µ2(dω˜). (C.10)
The above is equivalent to µ1(Ω˜ ∩ U) ≤ µ2(Ω˜ ∩ U) for every of ℜk¯’s upper sets U , a set
satisfying ω2 ∈ U whenever ω1 ∈ U and ω1 ≤ ω2; see, e.g., Section 6.B.1 of Shaked and
Shanthikumar [47]. Given µ1, µ2 ∈ P(Ω˜), we can construct µ1 ∨ µ2 ∈ P(Ω˜) by forcing its
value at Ω˜ ∩K for every upper rectangular set K be µ1(Ω˜ ∩K) ∨ µ2(Ω˜ ∩K). Similarly, we
can obtain µ1 ∧ µ2 ∈ P(Ω˜). Thus, P(Ω˜) is a lattice under the usual stochastic order. For a
partial order between sublattices of P(Ω˜), we can adopt the induced set order; see Theorem
2.4.1 of Topkis [50]. For sublattices P 1 and P 2 of P(Ω˜), we consider P 1 ≤ P 2 in the induced
set order sense when µ1 ∈ P 1 and µ2 ∈ P 2 will always lead to
µ1 ∧ µ2 ∈ P 1, µ1 ∨ µ2 ∈ P 2. (C.11)
We can adopt the component-wise partial order for each lattice (P(Ω˜))T−n . This way,
ν1 ≡ (ν1t−n)t−n∈T−n , ν
2 ≡ (ν2t−n)t−n∈T−n ∈ (P(Ω˜))
T−n are considered to satisfy ν1 ≤ ν2 when
ν1t−n ≤ ν
2
t−n
, ∀t−n ∈ T−n. (C.12)
49
This partial order certainly applies to the smaller lattice M(T−n,P(Ω˜)) as well. For the
latter’s sublattices, we can similarly adopt the induced set order.
We now make further assumptions on the game’s model primitives.
Monotonic Assumption 1 For any n ∈ N , tn ∈ Tn, t−n ∈ T−n, an ∈ An, and a−n ∈ A−n,
the payoff-utility u˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ω˜) is increasing in ω˜ ∈ Ω˜.
Monotonic Assumption 2 For any n ∈ N , the payoff-utility function u˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ω˜)
has increasing differences between an ∈ An and (tn, t−n, a−n, ω˜) ∈ Tn × T−n × A−n × Ω˜, as
well as between (tn, t−n, a−n) ∈ Tn × T−n × A−n and ω˜ ∈ Ω˜.
Monotonic Assumption 3 For any n ∈ N , the distribution pn,tn is monotone in tn ∈ Tn
in the usual stochastic order, so that for any t1n, t
2
n ∈ Tn with t
1
n ≤ t
2
n and any f ∈M(T−n,ℜ),∑
t−n∈T−n
pn,t1n|t−n · ft−n ≤
∑
t−n∈T−n
pn,t2n|t−n · ft−n .
Monotonic Assumption 4 For any n ∈ N , tn ∈ Tn, and t−n ∈ T−n, the prior set P˜n,tn,t−n
is a sublattice of the lattice P(Ω˜).
Monotonic Assumption 5 For any n ∈ N and t−n ∈ T−n, the prior set P˜n,tn,t−n is in-
creasing in tn ∈ Tn.
Monotonic Assumption 1 essentially associates higher ω˜ values with better payoffs. In
Monotonic Assumption 2, the payoff-utility function’s increasing differences between player
n’s own action an and the type-action profile (tn, t−n, a−n) is quite anticipated for a game
involving strategic complementarites. They indicate the increasing efficiency of a player un-
der ever more friendly environments. These properties are also required in the traditional
expected-utility version as well; see, e.g., van Zandt and Vives [54]. The full plate of increas-
ing differences involving the newly added factor ω˜, which resemble those for the action an,
suggest that the latter should bear the interpretation of not only an efficiency booster but
also somehow a surrogate action.
Note that the action space An is a subset of the single-dimensional real line; also, u˜n,tn,t−n
is already assumed to be continuous. So we have no need for additional supermodularity
and continuity requirements on u˜n,tn,t−n(·, a−n, ω˜). For any u˜
0
n,tn,t−n
(an, a−n) already suitable
as a payoff function for the traditional game, u˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ω˜) defined in terms of
u˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ω˜) = u˜
0
n,tn,t−n
(an, a−n) + (αntn + βnt−n + γnan + υna−n + ζn) · ω˜, (C.13)
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where αn, βn, γn, and υn are positive constants, and ζn is a constant guaranteeing the
positivity of the entire multiplier in front of ω˜, will satisfy Monotonic Assumption 2.
Meanwhile, Monotonic Assumption 3 suggests that a player’s own type is positively
correlated with his opponents’ types. It has been assumed for the traditional game as well;
see van Zandt and Vives [54]. Finally, Monotonic Assumptions 4 and 5 collectively indicate
that a player’s own type is positively correlated with the external factors. Taken together,
the latter two points both highlight the informational value of a player’s own type.
C.3 Monotone Pure Equilibria
Now we can obtain an intermediate result of the order-theoretic nature.
Proposition 17 For v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, µ) defined at (C.8), it is both supermodular and sub-
modular in µ ∈ P(Ω˜). Also, it has increasing differences between an ∈ An and (tn, t−n, a−n, µ)
∈ Tn×T−n×A−n×P(Ω˜), as well as between (tn, t−n, a−n) ∈ Tn×T−n×A−n and µ ∈ P(Ω˜).
To go any further, however, we find it necessary to consider separately two special sce-
narios. In scenario A, the distributions pn,tn are independent of tn. We can thus use p
A
n|t−n
to stand for each probability pn,tn|t−n . Also, the prior sets P˜n,tn,t−n can be some general
P˜An,tn,t−n ’s. However, each Kn,tn is equal to the set of monotone mappingsM(T−n,P(Ω˜)). In
view of (C.9), the latter two facts together lead to
QAn,tn ≡

 ∏
t−n∈T−n
P˜An,tn,t−n

⋂M(T−n,P(Ω˜)). (C.14)
Here, player n should not expect to gain from the identity of his own type tn any informa-
tion about opponents’ types t−n; yet, he should anticipate the latter types to be positively
correlated with the external factor ω˜.
In scenario B, the probabilities pn,tn|t−n ’s can be some general p
B
n,tn|t−n
’s. However, the
prior set P˜n,tn,t−n is independent of t−n, and hence is representable by P˜
B
n,tn . In addition,
each Kn,tn is equal to 1(T−n,P(Ω˜)), the set of constant mappings from T−n to P(Ω˜). Note
that 1(T−n,P(Ω˜)) ⊆M(T−n,P(Ω˜)). In view of (C.9), the above would lead to
QBn,tn ≡
(
(P˜Bn,tn)
T−n
)⋂
1(T−n,P(Ω˜)). (C.15)
Here, player n can learn from his own type tn something about opponents’ types t−n; yet,
these latter types will play no role in shaping his understanding of the external factor Ω˜.
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Proposition 18 For w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν) defined at (C.7), it is both supermodular and submod-
ular in ν ∈M(T−n,P(Ω˜)), and has increasing differences between an ∈ An and (tn, a−n, ν) ∈
Tn ×
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am)×M(T−n,P(Ω˜)), as well as between a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) and
ν ∈M(T−n,P(Ω˜)). In addition, the function has increasing differences between tn ∈ Tn and
ν ∈M(T−n,P(Ω˜)) in scenario A and between tn ∈ Tn and ν ∈ 1(T−n,P(Ω˜)) in scenario B.
Proposition 19 For Qn,tn defined at (C.9), regardless of the scenario that prevails, at each
fixed tn it is a nonempty sublattice of (P(Ω˜))
T−n and hence a nonempty lattice in its own
right. Also, it is increasing in tn.
It is noteworthy that in Proposition 18, we have restricted a−n ∈
∏
m6=nA
Tm
m to monotone
opponent strategies in
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) and ν ∈ (P(Ω˜))
T−n to monotone opponent-type-to-
state-distribution maps in M(T−n,P(Ω˜)). Moreover, the need there to prove the increasing
differences that w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν) has between tn and ν has prevented us from considering
the more general case, where the conditional probabilities pn,tn|t−n take the more general
B-version and the prior sets Qn,tn take the more general A-version.
The following lemma is about the preservation of increasing differences after maximization
in the nature of (C.6). It is likely to be useful in other circumstances.
Lemma 3 Given partially ordered sets X and Y , as well as lattice Z, let f be a real-valued
function defined on X × Y × Z, and Z˜(y) be a subset of Z at each y ∈ Y . Suppose that (I)
f has increasing differences between x ∈ X and (y, z) ∈ Y × Z, that (II) f is supermodular
in z ∈ Z, that (III) each Z˜(y) is a sublattice, and that (IV) Z˜(·) is increasing in y. Also,
suppose that (V) f has increasing differences between y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z. Then, for
g(x, y) = sup
z∈Z˜(y)
f(x, y, z),
it will follow that g has increasing differences between x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
We have singled out hypothesis (V) in Lemma 3 regarding f ’s increasing differences
between y and z, because it seems the most demanding to us. This is the reason why
Proposition 18 is concerned even with increasing differences between a−n and ν, which ripple
back to similar requirements in Proposition 17 and to Monotonic Assumption 2. Note that
Theorem 2.7.6 of Topkis [50] goes from the supermodularity of f in (x, y) and lattice nature
of Y to the supermodularity of g as defined in g(x) = supy∈Y f(x, y). Our result is of a
similar nature. With it, we can obtain a result key to equilibrium analysis.
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Proposition 20 For s˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n) defined at (C.6), it has increasing differences between
an ∈ An and (tn, a−n) ∈ Tn ×
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am).
Recall that u˜n,tn,t−n is continuous on a compact space. Through (C.6) to (C.8), this will
lead to the continuity of s˜n,tn(·, a−n). Since each An is a finite set or closed interval within
the real line, not only is each An a complete lattice but s˜n,tn(·, a−n) is also supermodular.
Now the complete-lattice nature of the An’s, as well as the continuity, supermodularity,
and Proposition 20’s increasing differences will have provided essential elements of a game
possessing strategic complementarities. Our ensuing analysis can lean on existing works such
as Milgrom and Roberts [35], Milgrom and Shannon [36], and Yang and Qi [53].
Combining Theorems 1 and 2 of Milgrom and Roberts [35] (also summarized as Fact 2
of Yang and Qi [53]), we can conclude that each best-response action set B˜n,tn(a−n) defined
at (C.4) is a nonempty complete sublattice of An. By Milgrom and Shannon [36] (also
summarized as Fact 3 of Yang and Qi [53]), we further know that B˜n,tn(a−n) is increasing
in (tn, a−n) ∈ Tn ×
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am). The remainder of the development closely follows
Yang and Qi [53]. As noted by it, each M(Tn, An), the space of monotone type-to-action
mappings of player n, is a complete lattice. Now for any n ∈ N , define correspondence
B˜n :
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) ⇒M(Tn, An) from the space of monotone type-to-action mappings
of other players to the space of the current player’s monotone type-to-action mappings:
B˜n(a−n) =
{
an ≡ (an,tn)tn∈Tn ∈M(Tn, an)|an,tn ∈ B˜n,tn(a−n) ∀tn ∈ Tn
}
, (C.16)
for any a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am). The following is a useful characterization.
Proposition 21 For the correspondence B˜n defined at (C.16), it is a nonempty complete
sublattice of M(Tn, An) at each a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am). Also, it is increasing in a−n.
Define a correspondence B˜ from the complete lattice
∏
n∈NM(Tn, An) to itself so that
a′ ∈ B˜(a) if and only if a′n ∈ B˜n(a−n) for any n ∈ N. (C.17)
Now Proposition 21 will make B˜(a) a nonempty complete sublattice of
∏
n∈NM(Tn, An) at
every a ∈
∏
n∈N M(Tn, An) that is increasing in a. According to the discussion around (C.4),
fixed points of B˜ will form pure and type-monotone equilibria of the special enterprising
game Γ sense. Following the fixed point theorem of Zhou [55], which is a generalization of
the classical result of Tarski [48], we have the following existence result.
Theorem 7 The set of B˜’s fixed points, E˜ ≡ {a ∈
∏
n∈N M(Tn, An)|a ∈ B˜(a)}, is a
nonempty complete lattice. Thus, Γ has pure and monotone equilibria.
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In languages used earlier, Theorem 7 will result with
1A ∩ E
a = 1A ∩ E
d ⊇ 1E˜ ≡ {1a ∈ 1A|a ∈ E˜} 6= ∅. (C.18)
As E˜ is a nonempty complete lattice, it has both the smallest and largest members. Let us
denote them by a˜∗ and a˜
∗, respectively.
C.4 Monotone Comparative Statics
Let Λ be a partially ordered set, and let (Γ(λ)|λ ∈ Λ) be a family of special enterprising
games finalized in Section C.2. For λ ∈ Λ, suppose games Γ(λ) share a common set of
players N , state space Ω˜, type-space vector (Tn)n∈N , and action-space vector (An)n∈N . How-
ever, the utility functions (u˜n,t(λ))n∈N,t∈T , distributions (pn,tn(λ))n∈N,tn∈Tn , and prior sets
(Q˜n,tn(λ))n∈N,tn∈Tn are allowed to be λ-dependent.
We can define v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ν|λ), w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν|λ), and s˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n|λ), respec-
tively, using almost the same albeit λ-dependent (C.8), (C.7), and (C.6). We can then
define B˜n,tn(a−n|λ), B˜n(a−n|λ), and B˜(a|λ), respectively, using almost the same albeit λ-
dependent (C.4), (C.16), and (C.17). It is possible to predict how B˜(·|λ)’s extremal fixed
points a˜∗(λ) and a˜
∗(λ) would evolve with λ when the game Γ(λ)’s dependence on λ follows
certain conditions. Let us list the latter in the following.
Parametric Assumption 1 For any n ∈ N , tn ∈ Tn, t−n ∈ T−n, and a−n ∈ A−n, the
payoff-utility function u˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ω˜|λ) has increasing differences between (an, ω˜) ∈ An×
Ω˜ and λ ∈ Λ.
Parametric Assumption 2 For any n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn, the probability p
A
n ≡ (p
A
n|t−n
)t−n∈T−n
is invariant in λ ∈ Λ; also, the probability pBn,tn(λ) ≡ (p
B
n,tn|t−n
(λ))t−n∈T−n is monotone in
λ ∈ Λ in the usual stochastic order.
Parametric Assumption 3 For any n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn, the prior set P˜
A
n,tn,t−n
(λ) is
increasing in λ ∈ Λ for every t−n ∈ T−n and the prior set P˜
B
n,tn(λ) is increasing in λ ∈ Λ.
The increasing differences between an and λ in Parametric Assumption 1 and the mono-
tonicity in λ of probabilities pBn,tn(λ) in Parametric Assumption 2 are required for even the
traditional game; see van Zandt and Vives [54]. When ambiguities on the external factors
ω˜ are further involved, it should not be surprising that increasing differences between ω˜ and
λ be postulated in Parametric Assumption 1 and the monotonicity in λ of prior sets be
postulated in Parametric Assumption 3.
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These assumptions will lead to the following intermediate results of the order-theoretic
nature. The requirement in Parametric Assumption 2 that the probabilities pAn be invariant
in λ is especially needed for the proof of Proposition 23.
Proposition 22 For v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, µ|λ) defined at the λ-dependent version of (C.8), it
has increasing differences between (an, µ) ∈ An × P(Ω˜) and λ ∈ Λ.
Proposition 23 For w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν|λ) defined at the λ-dependent version of (C.7), it has
increasing differences between an ∈ An and λ ∈ Λ. In addition, the function has in-
creasing differences between ν ∈ M(T−n,P(Ω˜)) and λ ∈ Λ in scenario A and between
ν ∈ 1(T−n,P(Ω˜)) and λ ∈ Λ in scenario B.
Proposition 24 For Qn,tn(λ) defined at the λ-dependent version of (C.9), regardless of the
scenario that prevails, it is increasing in λ at each fixed n ∈ N and tn ∈ Tn.
Proposition 25 For s˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n|λ) defined at the λ-dependent version of (C.6), it has
increasing differences between an,tn ∈ An and λ ∈ Λ at each fixed n ∈ N , tn ∈ Tn, and
a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am).
The key to the rest of the derivation is the monotonicity of the correspondence defined
at (C.16). Ideas from Yang and Qi [53] can be borrowed in its proof.
Proposition 26 For the correspondence B˜n(a−n|λ) defined at the λ-dependent (C.16), it is
monotonically increasing in λ ∈ Λ at each fixed a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am).
From Proposition 26 and the λ-dependent version of (C.17), we can immediately have
the monotonicity of B˜(a|λ) in λ at each fixed a ∈
∏
n∈N M(Tn, An). Using Lemma 4 of Yang
and Qi [53], a counterpart to Tarski’s [48] monotone comparative statics result in Zhou’s [55]
setting, we can then achieve monotonicity of the extremal equilibria as λ varies.
Theorem 8 The enterprising game Γ(λ)’ smallest and largest pure and monotone equilibria,
a˜∗(λ) and a˜
∗(λ), are both increasing in λ ∈ Λ.
For scenario A, i.e., the one involving special type distributions but more general am-
biguity attitudes on external factors, our general message about monotone equilibria that
evolve monotonically over exogenous parameters is consistent with the one derived for the
traditional expected-utility case. For the latter, see, e.g., van Zandt and Vives [54]. For
scenario B, i.e., the one involving general type distributions but special ambiguity attitudes,
barring some minutiae our results can even be thought of as generalizations of existing ones.
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C.5 Competitive Pricing with Uncertain Demand
We now consider a situation that fits the theory developed so far in Appendix C.
Players from the set N ≡ {1, ..., n¯} are firms engaged in price competition in a common
market for their manufactured product items. Suppose it costs an for firm n to manufacture
a unit item. Also, let the firm’s type tn ∈ Tn ≡ {1, ..., t¯n} ⊆ ℜ stand for a factor of the
demand that it is to face. The firm’s action space An ≡ [an, an] ⊆ ℜ denotes the range of
prices that it can charge. Suppose the state space Ω˜ ≡ [0, ω] contains positive global additive
factors to demands faced by all firms. We take the demand faced by firm n to be
φn,tn(an, a−n, ω˜) = b¯n − c¯n · an +
∑
m6=n
d¯nm · am + e¯n · tn + f¯n · ω˜ + g¯n · tnω˜, (C.19)
where b¯n, c¯n, (d¯nm)m6=n, e¯n, f¯n, and g¯n are positive constants. Basically, demand to firm n
will decline when the firm raises its price; but it will rise when competitors raise their prices.
Moreover, both tn and ω˜ serve as demand boosters, with the former being locally confined
and the latter globally felt. The last term indicates that their effects may be compounded.
The profit that firm n can earn is therefore
u˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ω˜) = (an − an) · φn,tn(an, a−n, ω˜)
= (an − an) · (b¯n − c¯n · an +
∑
m6=n d¯nm · am + e¯n · tn + f¯n · ω˜ + g¯n · tnω˜),
(C.20)
which is independent of t−n. More importantly, the function is increasing in ω˜. So Monotonic
Assumption 1 is satisfied. Taking derivatives, we obtain
∂u˜n,tn,t−n
∂an
(an, a−n, ω˜) = anc¯n+ b¯n− 2c¯n · an+
∑
m6=n
d¯nm · am+ e¯n · tn+ f¯n · ω˜+ g¯n · tnω˜, (C.21)
which is increasing in (tn, t−n, a−n, ω˜); also,
∂u˜n,tn,t−n
∂ω˜
(an, a−n, ω˜) = f¯n · an − anf¯n + g¯n · (an − an) · tn, (C.22)
which is increasing in (tn, t−n, a−n). Hence, Monotonic Assumption 2 is satisfied.
For local and global demand signals, suppose scenario A of Section C.2 takes over. This
means that players are unambiguous about their local signals but ambiguous about the global
one. Also, Monotonic Assumption 3 is automatic. In particular, each firm n believes that
other firms’ types are distributed according to some pAn ≡ (p
A
n|t−n
)t−n∈T−n , irrespective of its
own type tn; moreover, there are prior sets P˜
A
n,tn,t−n so that the Qn,tn used in (C.6) of its
decision making process is defined through (C.14).
Now, suppose the PAn,tn,t−n ’s are sublattices of P(Ω˜) that also increase with tn. The latter
monotonicity connotes a certain positive correlation between a firm’s local demand signal and
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the global one. Then, Monotonic Assumptions 4 and 5 will be satisfied. Thus, Theorem 7
can be used to predict that firms will be able to reach highest equilibrium pricing policies
a˜∗n,tn that are increasing in their observed local signals tn.
A partially ordered set Λ may provide parameters to the pricing game, so that the
constants b¯n, (d¯nm)m6=n, e¯n, f¯n, and g¯n and prior sets P˜
A
n,tn,t−n
are all functions of λ ∈ Λ.
From (C.20), we can explain the monotonicity of those constants with respect to λ by an
expanded demand base and demand’s heightened sensitivities to other players’ prices, as
well as local and global signals. When this is the case, we will be able to learn from (C.21)
and (C.22) the satisfaction of Parametric Assumption 1.
With the distributions pAn invariant in λ, Parametric Assumption 2 is automatic. Suppose
further that a higher λ also reflects firms’ bullish forecasts on the market, to the effect that
the prior sets P˜An,tn,t−n increase in λ as well. Then, Parametric Assumption 3 will be satisfied.
The end result is that Theorem 8 can now be used to predict the increase of the highest
monotone equilibrium a˜∗ with respect to the changing λ. This result is quite anticipated,
as bigger markets, more reactive demands, and brightened outlooks will embolden firms to
price more aggressively.
D Proofs for Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 17: At any fixed n ∈ N , tn ∈ Tn, and t−n ∈ T−n, define q by
q(ω˜) ≡ u˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ω˜). (D.1)
The continuity of u˜n,tn,t−n suggests that q, as a real-valued function defined on the com-
pact Ω˜, is lower bounded by some un,tn,t−n(an, a−n). Monotonic Assumption 1 also states
that it is increasing. The former property indicates that µ · q−1 for any µ ∈ P(Ω˜) is a
cumulative distribution function (cdf) say F on the real interval [un,tn,t−n(an, a−n),+∞).
The latter property means that q−1([un,tn,t−n(an, a−n), x]) is a lower set in the sense that
ω˜1 ∈ q−1([un,tn,t−n(an, a−n), x]) whenever ω˜
2 ∈ q−1([un,tn,t−n(an, a−n), x]) and ω˜
1 ≤ ω˜2. Thus,
due to the partial order we have chosen for P(Ω˜), for any members µ1 and µ2,
[(µ1 ∨ µ2) · q−1]([un,tn,t−n(an, a−n), x])
= (µ1 · q−1)([un,tn,t−n(an, a−n), x]) ∧ (µ
2 · q−1)([un,tn,t−n(an, a−n), x]).
(D.2)
The same applies to the opposite combination of “∨” and “∧” as well. Then, for cdf’s
F 1 ≡ µ1 · q−1 and F 2 ≡ µ2 · q−1, we have
F 1 ∧ F 2 = (µ1 ∨ µ2) · q−1, F 1 ∨ F 2 = (µ1 ∧ µ2) · q−1. (D.3)
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Hence,
∫
Ω˜
q(ω˜) · (µ1 ∨ µ2)(dω˜) +
∫
Ω˜
q(ω˜) · (µ1 ∧ µ2)(dω˜)
=
∫ +∞
un,tn,t−n
(an,a−n)
x · (F 1 ∧ F 2)(dx) +
∫ +∞
un,tn,t−n
(an,a−n)
x · (F 1 ∨ F 2)(dx)
= 2 · un,tn,t−n(an, a−n) +
∫ +∞
un,tn,t−n
(an,a−n)
(1− F 1(x) ∧ F 2(x)) · dx
+
∫ +∞
un,tn,t−n
(an,a−n)
(1− F 1(x) ∨ F 2(x)) · dx
= 2 · un,tn,t−n(an, a−n) +
∫ +∞
un,tn,t−n
(an,a−n)
(1− F 1(x)) · dx
+
∫ +∞
un,tn,t−n
(an,a−n)
(1− F 2(x)) · dx
=
∫ +∞
un,tn,t−n
(an,a−n)
x · F 1(dx) +
∫ +∞
un,tn,t−n
(an,a−n)
x · F 2(dx)
=
∫
Ω˜
q(ω˜) · µ1(dω˜) +
∫
Ω˜
q(ω˜) · µ2(dω˜),
(D.4)
where the first and fifth equalities are achieved through changes of variables, the second and
fourth equalities come from integrals by parts, and the third equality is due to the fact that
F 1(x) ∧ F 2(x) + F 1(x) ∨ F 2(x) = F 1(x) + F 2(x). (D.5)
In view of (C.8) and (D.1), we have from (D.4) that v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ·) is both supermodular
and submodular as a real-valued function defined on P(Ω˜).
Now suppose µ ∈ P(Ω˜) is fixed. Then, due to the average in (C.8) and the increasing
differences stated in Monotonic Assumption 2, v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, µ) will have increasing differ-
ences between an ∈ An and (tn, t−n, a−n) ∈ Tn×T−n×A−n. Next, suppose t
1
n, t
2
n ∈ Tn satisfy
t1n ≤ t
2
n, t
1
−n, t
2
−n ∈ T−n satisfy t
1
−n ≤ t
2
−n, a
1
n, a
2
n ∈ An satisfy a
1
n ≤ a
2
n, and a
1
−n, a
2
−n ∈ A−n
satisfy a1−n ≤ a
2
−n. Then, we note the increasing trend of q for
q(ω˜) ≡ u˜n,t2n,t2−n(a
2
n, a
2
−n, ω˜)− u˜n,t1n,t1−n(a
1
n, a
1
−n, ω˜), (D.6)
due to the increasing differences between (tn, t−n, an, a−n) ∈ Tn×T−n×An×A−n and ω˜ ∈ Ω˜
as stated in Monotonic Assumption 2. Thus, for µ1, µ2 ∈ P(Ω˜) satisfying µ1 ≤ µ2,∫
Ω˜
q(ω˜) · µ1(dω˜) ≤
∫
Ω˜
q(ω˜) · µ2(dω˜). (D.7)
In view of (C.8) and (D.6), this will amount to the increasing differences that v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, µ)
enjoys between (tn, t−n, an, a−n) ∈ Tn × T−n × An ×A−n and µ ∈ P(Ω˜).
Proof of Proposition 18: First, the average in (C.7) and the simultaneous supermodularity
and submodularity stated in Proposition 17 will lead to the simultaneous supermodularity
and submodularity of w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν) at every component νt−n . Due to the component-wise
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nature of the partial order assigned toM(T−n,P(Ω˜)), this also means that w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν)
is both supermodular and submodular in ν ≡ (νt−n)t−n∈T−n ∈ M(T−n,P(Ω˜)).
Now suppose tn ∈ Tn is fixed. Then, due to the average in (C.7) and the increasing
differences stated in Proposition 17, w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν) will have increasing differences between
an ∈ An and (a−n, ν) ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) × M(T−n,P(Ω˜)), as well as between a−n ∈∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) and ν ∈M(T−n,P(Ω˜)).
Next, suppose a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) and ν ∈ M(T−n,P(Ω˜)) are fixed, while a
1
n, a
2
n ∈
An satisfy a
1
n ≤ a
2
n. Define f ≡ (ftn,t−n)tn∈Tn,t−n∈T−n so that
ftn,t−n ≡ v˜n,tn,t−n(a
2
n, a−n,t−n, νt−n)− v˜n,tn,t−n(a
1
n, a−n,t−n, νt−n). (D.8)
Due to the increasing differences between an ∈ An and (tn, t−n, a−n,t−n, ν−n,t−n) ∈ Tn ×
T−n × A−n × P(Ω˜) as stated in Proposition 17, as well as the memberships of a−n in∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) and ν in M(T−n,P(Ω˜)), we know that ftn,t−n is increasing in both tn
and t−n. But by Monotonic Assumption 3, this will translate into∑
t−n∈T−n
pn,t1n|t−n · ft1n,t−n ≤
∑
t−n∈T−n
pn,t1n|t−n · ft2n,t−n ≤
∑
t−n∈T−n
pn,t2n|t−n · ft2n,t−n, (D.9)
whenever t1n ≤ t
2
n. In view of (C.7) and (D.8), this will amount to the increasing differences
that w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν) enjoys between an ∈ An and tn ∈ Tn.
Suppose an ∈ An and a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) are fixed, while ν
1, ν2 ∈ M(T−n,P(Ω˜))
satisfy ν1 ≤ ν2. Define g ≡ (gtn,t−n)tn∈Tn,t−n∈T−n so that
gtn,t−n ≡ v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n,t−n, ν
2
t−n)− v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n,t−n , ν
1
t−n). (D.10)
Due to the increasing differences between tn ∈ Tn and νt−n ∈ P(Ω˜) as stated in Propo-
sition 17, we know that gtn,t−n is increasing in tn. But by averaging, this will translate
into ∑
t−n∈T−n
pAn|t−n · gt1n,t−n ≤
∑
t−n∈T−n
pAn|t−n · gt2n,t−n , (D.11)
whenever t1n ≤ t
2
n. In view of (C.7) and (D.10), this will amount to the increasing differences
that w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν) enjoys between tn ∈ Tn and ν ∈M(T−n,P(Ω˜)) in scenario A.
In addition, suppose an ∈ An and a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) are fixed, while ν
1, ν2 ∈
1(T−n,P(Ω˜)) satisfy ν
1 ≤ ν2. Define h ≡ (htn,t−n)tn∈Tn,t−n∈T−n so that
htn,t−n ≡ v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n,t−n, ν
2
t−n
)− v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n,t−n, ν
1
t−n
). (D.12)
Due to ν1 and ν2’s memberships in 1(T−n,P(Ω˜)), neither ν
1
t−n
nor ν2t−n depends on t−n. So
by the increasing differences between (tn, t−n, a−n,t−n) ∈ Tn×T−n×A−n and νt−n ∈ P(Ω˜) as
stated in Proposition 17, as well as the membership of a−n in
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am), we know
that htn,t−n is increasing in both tn and t−n. But by Monotonic Assumption 3,∑
t−n∈T−n
pBn,t1n|t−n · ht1n,t−n ≤
∑
t−n∈T−n
pBn,t1n|t−n · ht2n,t−n ≤
∑
t−n∈T−n
pBn,t2n|t−n · ht2n,t−n , (D.13)
whenever t1n ≤ t
2
n. In view of (C.7) and (D.12), this will amount to the increasing differences
that w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν) enjoys between tn ∈ Tn and ν ∈ 1(T−n,P(Ω˜)) in scenario B.
Proof of Proposition 19: For scenario A, we first show thatQAn,tn as defined through (C.14)
is a sublattice of (P(Ω˜))T−n. Suppose ν1, ν2 ∈ QAn,tn . Then, according to (C.14), ν
1
t−n
, ν2t−n ∈
P˜An,tn,t−n for any t−n ∈ T−n. So by Monotonic Assumption 4,
ν1t−n ∧ ν
2
t−n
, ν1t−n ∨ ν
2
t−n
∈ P˜An,tn,t−n, ∀t−n ∈ T−n. (D.14)
In addition, both ν1t−n ∧ν
2
t−n and ν
1
t−n ∨ν
2
t−n will continue to be increasing in t−n just because
both ν1t−n and ν
2
t−n are. But by (C.14), this leads back to
ν1 ∧ ν2, ν1 ∨ ν2 ∈ QAn,tn . (D.15)
Hence, QAn,tn is a sublattice of (P(Ω˜))
T−n.
We next prove that QAn,tn is nonempty. Since P˜
A
n,tn,t−n
for each t−n ∈ T−n is nonempty,
we can pick one νt−n from every P˜
A
n,tn,t−n
. Let us go through every m 6= n in the order
of m = 1, ..., n − 1, n + 1, ..., n¯. Suppose we are at a particular m 6= n. Then, for every
t−(n,m) ∈ T−(n,m) ≡
∏
l 6=n,m Tl, we go through the procedure of
νtm,t−(n,m) =
t¯m∧
τm=tm
ν ′τm,t−(n,m) , ∀tm = 1, 2, ..., t¯m − 1, (D.16)
and
νtm,t−(n,m) = ν
′
tm,t−(n,m)
, ∀tm = 1, 2, ..., t¯m − 1. (D.17)
We now show that the ν assembled from all the νt−n ’s after the procedure is a member of
QAn,tn as defined through (C.14). First, due to Monotonic Assumption 5, we can iteratively
show that during the procedure,
νtm,t−(n,m) ∈ P˜
A
n,tm,t−(n,m)
, in the order of tm = t¯m, t¯m − 1, ...1, (D.18)
for every t−(n,m) ∈ T−(n,m). Second, after the procedure, for every m 6= n and every t−(n,m) ∈
T−(n,m), the new νtm,t−(n,m) is certainly increasing in tm. For any t
1
−n, t
2
−n ∈ T−n satisfying
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t1−n ≤ t
2
−n, note that t
1
m ≤ t
2
m for any m 6= n. We can thus traverse from t
1
−n to t
2
−n in the
order of t1−n ≡ (t
1
1, t
1
−(n,1)), (t
1
1+1, t
1
−(n,1)), ..., (t
2
1, t
1
−(n,1)) ≡ (t
2
1, t
1
2, t
1
−(n,1,2)), (t
2
1, t
1
2+1, t
1
−(n,1,2)),
..., (t2(1,2), t
1
−(n,1,2)) ≡ (t
2
(1,2), t
1
3, t
1
−(n,1,2,3)), ......, (t
2
−(n,n¯), t
2
n¯ − 1), (t
2
−(n,n¯), t
2
n¯) ≡ t
2
−n. Along the
path, the t−n encountered keeps rising. This implies that the associated νt−n would keep
rising as well. Consequently, we can reach νt1
−n
≤ νt2
−n
. That is, the assembled ν is a member
ofM(T−n,P(Ω˜)). Taking both points together, we can see that ν is a member of Q
A
n,tn as it
is defined at (C.14). So QAn,tn 6= ∅.
Finally, we verify the increasing trend of QAn,tn in tn. Suppose t
1
n, t
2
n ∈ Tn satisfy t
1
n ≤ t
2
n;
also, ν1 ∈ QAn,t1n and ν
2 ∈ QAn,t2n . Then, according to (C.14), ν
1
t−n
∈ P˜An,t1n,t−n and ν
2
t−n
∈
P˜An,t2n,t−n for any t−n ∈ T−n, and both ν
1
t−n
and ν2t−n are increasing in t−n. So by Monotonic
Assumption 5,
ν1t−n ∧ ν
2
t−n ∈ P˜
A
n,t1n,t−n
, ν1t−n ∨ ν
2
t−n ∈ P˜
A
n,t2n,t−n
, ∀t−n ∈ T−n. (D.19)
Both ν1t−n ∧ ν
2
t−n and ν
1
t−n ∨ ν
2
t−n are still increasing in t−n. But by (C.14), this leads back to
ν1 ∧ ν2 ∈ P˜n,t1n , ν
1 ∨ ν2 ∈ P˜n,t2n. (D.20)
Hence, QAn,tn is increasing in tn.
For scenario B, we know that QBn,tn as defined through (C.15) is nonempty just because
P˜Bn,tn is nonempty. It is a sublattice of (P(Ω˜))
T−n just because, due to Monotonic Assump-
tion 4, P˜Bn,tn is a sublattice of P(Ω˜). Also, it is increasing in tn just because, due to Monotonic
Assumption 5, P˜Bn,tn is increasing in tn.
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose x1, x2 ∈ X satisfy x1 ≤ x2 and y1, y2 ∈ Y satisfy y1 ≤ y2.
For any ǫ > 0, we can choose z12 ∈ Z˜(y2) so that
f(x1, y2, z12) ≥ sup
z∈Z˜(y2)
f(x1, y2, z)− ǫ = g(x1, y2)− ǫ, (D.21)
and z21 ∈ Z˜(y1) so that
f(x2, y1, z21) ≥ sup
z∈Z˜(y1)
f(x2, y1, z)− ǫ = g(x2, y1)− ǫ. (D.22)
Since Z˜(y)’s are sublattices that increase with y,
z12 ∧ z21 ∈ Z˜(y1), z12 ∨ z21 ∈ Z˜(y2). (D.23)
Now, by f ’s increasing differences between x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ,
f(x1, y1, z12)− f(x2, y1, z12) + f(x2, y2, z12)− f(x1, y2, z12) ≥ 0; (D.24)
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by f ’s increasing differences between x ∈ X and z ∈ Z,
f(x1, y1, z21)− f(x2, y1, z21)− f(x1, y1, z12 ∨ z21) + f(x2, y1, z12 ∨ z21) ≥ 0; (D.25)
by f ’s supermodularity in z ∈ Z,
f(x1, y1, z12 ∧ z21)− f(x1, y1, z12)− f(x1, y1, z21) + f(x1, y1, z12 ∨ z21) ≥ 0; (D.26)
in addition, by f ’s increasing differences between y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z,
f(x2, y1, z12)− f(x2, y2, z12)− f(x2, y1, z12 ∨ z21) + f(x2, y2, z12 ∨ z21) ≥ 0. (D.27)
Adding up (D.24) to (D.27) together, we obtain
f(x1, y1, z12 ∧ z21)− f(x1, y2, z12)− f(x2, y1, z21) + f(x2, y2, z12 ∨ z21) ≥ 0. (D.28)
When this is combined with (D.21) to (D.23), we have
g(x1, y1) + g(x2, y2) ≥ f(x1, y1, z12 ∧ z21) + f(x2, y2, z12 ∨ z21)
≥ f(x1, y2, z12) + f(x2, y1, z21) ≥ g(x1, y2) + g(x2, y1)− 2ǫ.
(D.29)
Since ǫ > 0 can be made arbitrarily small, it follows that
g(x1, y1) + g(x2, y2) ≥ g(x1, y2) + g(x2, y1). (D.30)
That is, g has increasing differences between x ∈ X and y ∈ Y .
Proof of Proposition 20: At any fixed n ∈ N , we can identify an,tn ∈ An with x ∈ X ,
(tn, a−n) ∈ Tn ×
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) with y ∈ Y , and ν ∈ (P(Ω˜))
T−n with z ∈ Z. Also,
we can identify w˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n, ν) with f(x, y, z), Qn,tn with Z˜(y), and s˜n,tn(an,tn, a−n) with
g(x, y). From Proposition 18, we know that (I), (II), and (V) of Lemma 3 are true. From
Proposition 19, we know that (III) and (IV) of Lemma 3 are also true. Now (C.6) dic-
tates that the relationship between f , Z˜, and g in Lemma 3 also applies here. So by that
lemma, we can derive that s˜n,tn(an,tn, a−n) has increasing differences between an,tn ∈ An and
(tn, a−n) ∈ Tn ×
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am).
Proof of Proposition 21: The proof has similarities to that for Theorem 1 of Yang and Qi
[53]. Define b˜n,tn(a−n) as player n’s highest best response to the given other-player monotone
type-to-action profile a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) when his own type is tn ∈ Tn:
b˜n,tn(a−n) = sup B˜n,tn(a−n), (D.31)
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where the latter set is defined at (C.4). The properties of B˜n,tn(a−n) will guarantee that
b˜n,tn(a−n) is both well defined and monotone in (tn, a−n). So given a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am),
the set B˜n(a−n) contains the element (b˜n,tn(a−n))tn∈Tn ∈M(Tn, An) and hence is nonempty.
For an arbitrary nonempty subset B of B˜n(a−n), we show that supB ∈ B˜n(a−n). Let
B|tn = {b
′ ∈ An|b
′ = btn for some b ≡ (btn)tn∈Tn ∈ B}, ∀tn ∈ Tn. (D.32)
Due to (C.16), B|tn must be a subset of B˜n,tn(a−n). But as the latter is a nonempty complete
sublattice of An, we know that
supB|tn ∈ B˜n,tn(a−n). (D.33)
Since the partial order on A Tnn is defined in the component-wise fashion, we have from (D.32)
supB = (supB|tn)tn∈Tn . (D.34)
From the fact that B ⊆ B˜n(a−n) ⊆ M(Tn, An), we also know that supB ∈ M(Tn, An).
Therefore, according to (C.16), supB ∈ B˜n(a−n). Symmetrically, we can also show that
inf B ∈ B˜n(a−n). Thus the latter is a complete sublattice of M(Tn, An).
To show that B˜n is a monotone correspondence from
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) to M(An, Tn),
suppose a1−n, a
2
−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) with a
1
−n ≤ a
2
−n. Since B˜n,tn is monotone in a−n,
B˜n,tn(a
1
−n) ≤ B˜n,tn(a
2
−n), ∀tn ∈ Tn. (D.35)
For b1 ≡ (b1tn)tn∈Tn ∈ B˜n(a
1
−n) and b
2 ≡ (b2tn)tn∈Tn ∈ B˜n(a
2
−n), we have from (C.16) that
b1tn ∈ B˜n,tn(a
1
−n) and b
2
tn ∈ B˜n,tn(a
2
−n), ∀tn ∈ Tn. (D.36)
But due to (D.35), we will have
b1tn ∧ b
2
tn ∈ B˜n,tn(a
1
−n) and b
1
tn ∨ b
2
tn ∈ B˜n,tn(a
2
−n), ∀tn ∈ Tn. (D.37)
Note that b1 ∧ b2 is merely (b1tn ∧ b
2
tn)tn∈Tn and b
1 ∨ b2 is merely (b1tn ∨ b
2
tn)tn∈Tn , and they are
within M(Tn, An) because b
1 and b2 are. Hence, we have from (C.16) that
b1 ∧ b2 ∈ B˜n(a
1
−n) and b
1 ∨ b2 ∈ B˜n(a
2
−n). (D.38)
This will translate into the monotonicity of the correspondence B˜n.
Proof of Proposition 22: First, due to the average in the λ-dependent version of (C.8)
and the increasing differences stated in Parametric Assumption 1, v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, µ|λ) will
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have increasing differences between an ∈ An and λ ∈ Λ. Next, suppose λ
1, λ2 ∈ Λ satisfy
λ1 ≤ λ2. Then, we note the increasing trend of q for
q(ω˜) ≡ u˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ω˜|λ
2)− u˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, ω˜|λ
1), (D.39)
due to the increasing differences between ω˜ ∈ Ω˜ and λ ∈ Λ as stated in Parametric Assump-
tion 1. Thus, for µ1, µ2 ∈ P(Ω˜) satisfying µ1 ≤ µ2, we have the same relation as that stated
in (D.7). In view of the λ-dependent version of (C.8) and (D.39), this will amount to the
increasing differences that v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n, µ|λ) enjoys between µ ∈ P(Ω˜) and λ ∈ Λ.
Proof of Proposition 23: Let n ∈ N , tn ∈ Tn, and a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) be fixed.
First, suppose ν ∈ M(T−n,P(Ω˜)) is fixed, while a
1
n, a
2
n ∈ An satisfy a
1
n ≤ a
2
n. Define
f ≡ (ft−n(λ))t−n∈T−n,λ∈Λ so that
ft−n(λ) ≡ v˜n,tn,t−n(a
2
n, a−n,t−n, νt−n |λ)− v˜n,tn,t−n(a
1
n, a−n,t−n, νt−n |λ). (D.40)
Due to the increasing differences between an ∈ An and (t−n, a−n,t−n, ν−n,t−n) ∈ T−n ×A−n ×
P(Ω˜) as stated in Proposition 17, as well as the memberships of a−n in
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am) and
ν in M(T−n,P(Ω˜)), we know that ft−n(λ) is increasing in t−n. By the increasing differences
between an ∈ An and λ ∈ Λ as stated in Proposition 22, we know that ft−n(λ) is increasing
in λ. But by Parametric Assumption 2, these will translate into∑
t−n∈T−n
pn,tn|t−n(λ
1) · ft−n(λ
1) ≤
∑
t−n∈T−n
pn,tn|t−n(λ
1) · ft−n(λ
2)
≤
∑
t−n∈T−n
pn,tn|t−n(λ
2) · ft−n(λ
2),
(D.41)
whenever λ1 ≤ λ2. In view of the λ-dependent version of (C.7) and (D.40), this will amount
to the increasing differences that w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν|λ) enjoys between an ∈ An and λ ∈ Λ.
Now, suppose an ∈ An is fixed, while ν
1, ν2 ∈ M(T−n,P(Ω˜)) satisfy ν
1 ≤ ν2. Define
g ≡ (gt−n(λ))t−n∈T−n,λ∈Λ so that
gt−n(λ) ≡ v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n,t−n , ν
2
t−n
|λ)− v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n,t−n , ν
1
t−n
|λ). (D.42)
Due to the increasing differences between νt−n ∈ P(Ω˜) and λ ∈ Λ as stated in Proposition 22,
we know that gt−n(λ) is increasing in λ. But by averaging over the probability p
A
n which is
invariant in λ according to Parametric Assumption 2, this will translate into∑
t−n∈T−n
pAn|t−n · gt−n(λ
1) ≤
∑
t−n∈T−n
pAn|t−n · gt−n(λ
2), (D.43)
whenever λ1 ≤ λ2. In view of the λ-dependent version of (C.7) and (D.42), this will amount
to the increasing differences that w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν|λ) enjoys between ν ∈ M(T−n,P(Ω˜)) and
λ ∈ Λ in scenario A.
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In addition, suppose an ∈ An is fixed, while ν
1, ν2 ∈ 1(T−n,P(Ω˜)) satisfy ν
1 ≤ ν2. Define
h ≡ (ht−n(λ))t−n∈T−n,λ∈Λ so that
ht−n(λ) ≡ v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n,t−n, ν
2
t−n
|λ)− v˜n,tn,t−n(an, a−n,t−n, ν
1
t−n
|λ). (D.44)
Due to ν1 and ν2’s memberships in 1(T−n,P(Ω˜)), neither ν
1
t−n
nor ν2t−n depends on t−n. So
by the increasing differences between (t−n, a−n,t−n) ∈ T−n × A−n and νt−n ∈ P(Ω˜) as stated
in Proposition 17, as well as the membership of a−n in
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am), we know that
ht−n(λ) is increasing in t−n. By the increasing differences between νt−n ∈ P(Ω˜) and λ ∈ Λ
as stated in Proposition 22, we know that ht−n(λ) is increasing in λ. But by Parametric
Assumption 2,
∑
t−n∈T−n
pBn,tn|t−n(λ
1) · ht−n(λ
1) ≤
∑
t−n∈T−n
pBn,tn|t−n(λ
1) · ht−n(λ
2)
≤
∑
t−n∈T−n
pBn,tn|t−n(λ
2) · ht−n(λ
2),
(D.45)
whenever λ1 ≤ λ2. In view of the λ-dependent version of (C.7) and (D.44), this will amount
to the increasing differences that w˜n,tn(an, a−n, ν|λ) enjoys between ν ∈ 1(T−n,P(Ω˜)) and
λ ∈ Λ in scenario B.
Proof of Proposition 24: For scenario A, suppose λ1, λ2 ∈ Λ satisfy λ1 ≤ λ2; also,
ν1 ∈ QAn,tn(λ
1) and ν2 ∈ QAn,tn(λ
2). Then, according to the λ-dependent version of (C.14),
ν1t−n ∈ P˜
A
n,tn,t−n
(λ1) and ν2t−n ∈ P˜
A
n,tn,t−n
(λ2) for any t−n ∈ T−n, and both ν
1
t−n
and ν2t−n are
increasing in t−n. So by Parametric Assumption 3,
ν1t−n ∧ ν
2
t−n
∈ P˜An,tn,t−n(λ
1), ν1t−n ∨ ν
2
t−n
∈ P˜An,tn,t−n(λ
2), ∀t−n ∈ T−n. (D.46)
Both ν1t−n ∧ ν
2
t−n and ν
1
t−n ∨ ν
2
t−n are still increasing in t−n. But by the λ-dependent version
of (C.14), this will lead back to
ν1 ∧ ν2 ∈ QAn,tn(λ
1), ν1 ∨ ν2 ∈ QAn,tn(λ
2). (D.47)
Hence, QAn,tn(λ) is increasing in λ.
For scenario B, we know that QBn,tn(λ) defined at the λ-dependent version of (C.15) is
increasing in λ just because, due to Parametric Assumption 3, P˜Bn,tn(λ) is increasing in λ. .
Proof of Proposition 25: At any fixed n ∈ N , tn ∈ Tn, and a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am), we
can identify an,tn ∈ An with x ∈ X , λ ∈ Λ with y ∈ Y , and ν ∈ M(T−n,P(Ω˜)) in scenario
A or ν ∈ 1(T−n,P(Ω˜)) in scenario B with z ∈ Z. Also, we can identify w˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n, ν|λ)
with f(x, y, z), Qn,tn(λ) with Z˜(y), and s˜n,tn(an,tn , a−n|λ) with g(x, y). From Propositions 18
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and 23, we know that (I), (II), and (V) of Lemma 3 are true. We have the validity of
Lemma 3’s (III) from Proposition 19 and that of the lemma’s (IV) from Proposition 24.
Now the λ-dependent version of (C.6) dictates that the relationship between f , Z˜, and g
in Lemma 3 also applies here. So by that lemma, we can derive that s˜n,tn(an,tn, a−n|λ) has
increasing differences between an,tn ∈ An and λ ∈ Λ.
Proof of Proposition 26: The proof has similarities to that for Theorem 2 of Yang and
Qi [53]. We first show that B˜n,tn(a−n|λ) defined at the λ-dependent version of (C.4) is
monotonically increasing in λ ∈ Λ at every n ∈ N , tn ∈ Tn, and a−n ∈
∏
m6=nM(Tm, Am).
For that purpose, let λ1, λ2 ∈ Λ satisfying λ1 ≤ λ2, a1n,tn ∈ B˜n,tn(a−n|λ
1), and a2n,tn ∈
B˜n,tn(a−n|λ
2) be given. It can be checked that
0 ≤ s˜n,tn(a
1
n,tn , a−n|λ
1)− s˜n,tn(a
1
n,tn ∧ a
2
n,tn , a−n|λ
1)
≤ s˜n,tn(a
1
n,tn , a−n|λ
2)− s˜n,tn(a
1
n,tn ∧ a
2
n,tn , a−n|λ
2)
= s˜n,tn(a
1
n,tn ∨ a
2
n,tn , a−n|λ
2)− s˜n,tn(a
2
n,tn , a−n|λ
2) ≤ 0,
(D.48)
where the first inequality is due to the optimality of a1n,tn for s˜n,tn(·, a−n|λ
1) as demanded by
B˜n,tn(a−n|λ
1)’s definition at the λ-dependent version of (C.4), the second inequality comes
from Proposition 25, the only equality is attributable to the fact that An is totally ordered,
and the last inequality is due to the optimality of a2n,tn for s˜n,tn(·, a−n|λ
2) as demanded
by B˜n,tn(a−n|λ
2)’s definition at the λ-dependent version of (C.4). The only possibility is
for all inequalities to be equalities. Thus, we must have a1n,tn ∧ a
2
n,tn ∈ B˜n,tn(a−n|λ
1) and
a1n,tn ∨ a
2
n,tn ∈ B˜n,tn(a−n|λ
2). Hence, the correspondence B˜n,tn(a−n|λ) is increasing in λ.
In view of the definition of B˜n(a−n|λ) from B˜n,tn(a−n|λ) through the λ-dependent version
of (C.16), it is clear that B˜n(a−n|λ) will be increasing in λ as well.
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